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Abstract 
 
The central contribution of this thesis is to prove, through qualitative analysis, that 
“Human Factor” is one of the most significant parameters in maritime business and 
more specifically in maritime transport.  
The current interest in Human Factor, in the maritime sector, arises from the fact, that 
technological, environmental and safety developments, have focused attention, on the 
need to consider human beings and their interaction with machines, materials, 
information, procedures and environments, in such developments and in designing a 
technological system. 
First comes safety, so there is a great need that companies and personnel, familiarize 
with the anthropocentric evolution of SAFETY I, known as SAFETY II. The 
aforementioned, when combined together, they can develop a secure SMS, when 
human element is involved in a proactive way. 
The OCIMF’s newest tool, TMSA 3, brings up revolutionary changes as far as the 
implementation of specific KPI’s and their best practice, for oil companies.  Innovations 
arise, through the benchmarking of TMSA 2 and TMSA 3. 
Concepts such as “human error”, “human reliability”, “resilience”, “human resource 
management”, and “leadership” are brought up in the forefront and with a human 
element analysis are being decoded.  
What is more, through the analysis of the implementation of those new concepts, 
“Human Factor” is validated as a KPI. 
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“Keep Ithaca always in mind. 
Arriving there is what you are destined for.” 
 
Excerpt from Ithaca 
Written in Greek by C. P. Cavafy 
Translated by Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard 
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Introduction 
 
The international regulations that affect safety, quality and management in the maritime 
sector are being presented, in the first chapter. In the shipping industry, rules and 
regulations are very important anchors, every company should comply with, in order to 
achieve best functional results. 
In the second chapter hierarchy pyramid presents, PIs, KPIs and SPIs as TMSA’s tools. 
TMSA3 and it’s 13 element format mentions the stages and the procedures that 
companies should come into compliance. What is more, TMSA3 brings up innovations. 
Human element occurs as a significant factor and key role in vetting. 
 Everything arises from the great need of safety in every single function, in maritime 
affairs. The need to changeover from Safety I to Safety II and the way that happened is 
unfolded, and the main points, of Safety and Just Culture, are also presented. 
Human element is extensively analyzed in this fourth chapter. The ideas of human error, 
human reliability, resilience and leadership interact with each other, as they are the 
domains that fulfil the matrix of a competent maritime structure. 
Finally, the results of the human element analysis decode, that human factor is a KPI. 
Each company should implement this KPI, in a different way, depending on the needs 
and peculiarities. Proposals of what may should be done in the future, are adduced in 
this dissertation. 
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1. International Organizations, Conventions and 
Regulations 
 
Humans have depended on seas, lakes and waterways, to transport products from one 
end to another all through the recorded history. Nowadays, over 90% of the world’s 
cargo is transported by merchant ships due to various reasons, counting that it is the 
cheapest form of transportation. In fact, from the early 1920s through the end of the 
century, the overall number of merchant ships within the world, expanded from beneath 
30,000 to around 90,000. Moreover, nowadays a large number of ships are being used 
for different military purposes all through the world. A modern ship is comprised of 
numerous components (systems), each of which features a varying degree of impact on 
the overall performance of the ship. In spite of the fact that numerous of these 
frameworks may be completely robotized, they still require a degree of human 
intercession (e.g., set starting resistances or react to alerts). Also, the non-automated 
frameworks may require direct human inputs for their operation and maintenance, 
people to get associated with other people, etc. As humans are not one hundred percent 
reliable, the past experiences indicate that in the shipping industry around 80% of all 
accidents are rooted in human error.  
The sinking of the Titanic on 15 April 1912, the Exxon Valdez oil spill on 24 March 
1989 and the sinking of the Costa Concordia on 13 January 2012 are three maritime 
tragedies during the past hundred years. They were main reasons for the establishment 
of several international organization and the enactment and development of regulations 
in order to enhance the safety of human life and protect the environment. 
 
1.1 IMO 
 
Maritime operations are commonly categorized as one of the foremost complex 
and unsafe industry inside the expansive industrial divisions globally (Celik, 2009; 
Hetherington et al., 2006). For this reason, the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) ceaselessly endeavors to guarantee the safety of maritime operations by 
providing international conventions such as the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and particular safety management guidelines such as the 
International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and Pollution 
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prevention (ISM Code). These and other regulations have brought 
a progressive enhancement of the security of maritime operations and maritime 
organizations in general (Kristiansen, 2013). Be that as it may, the impact of 
these security directions and rules on having a real proactive approach 
to sea security is still being addressed (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2013). Besides, in 
certain divisions of the maritime industry, the design and implementation of their safety 
management systems (SMS) are still impacted by a common restricted approach 
which focuses on satisfying the requests of the regulations appropriate to the 
organization (Schröder-Hinrichs,2010). 
The mission of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), as a United Nations 
specialized agency, is to advance secure, safe, ecologically sound, effective and 
sustainable shipping through participation. This will be fulfilled by embracing the 
highest practicable measures of maritime security and safety, efficiency of navigation 
and prevention and control of pollution from ships, as well as through consideration of 
the related legitimate things and successful usage of IMO instruments, with a view to 
their universal and uniform application (IMO, 2019). IMO 
will maintain its authority part as the worldwide controller of shipping, advance more 
noteworthy acknowledgment of the sector's significance and empower the headway of 
shipping, whereas tending to the challenges 
of proceeding improvements in innovation and world exchange and the need to meet 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
To achieve this, IMO will center on the survey, advancement and implementation of 
and compliance with IMO instruments in its interest to proactively distinguish, analyze 
and address rising issues and back up Member States in their implementation of the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (IMO, 2019).  
 
1.2 ILO 
 
Since its creation International Labor Organization (ILO) has had special machinery 
for seafarers such as the Joint Maritime Commission and the special Maritime Session 
of the International Labor Conference (ILC) (ILO, 2010, p.1). Moreover, human 
element has been the “raison d’être" for ILO since its formation (Bolle, 2006; Doumbia-
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Henry, 2010). As a result of this legacy on 23rd February 2006 during the 94th session 
of ILC at its 10th Maritime session we saw the advent of the Maritime Labor 
Convention (MLC) – 2006 (Orbie and Tortell, 2009; ILO, 2010). MLC – 2006 also 
known as, the “super convention” (DCOMM, 2010, p.1; ILO, 2010), 
solidifies and overhaul more than 65 international labor standards pertaining to 
seafarers (ILO, 2010). In view of Pierola (2010) and ILO (2010), the convention covers 
a wide range of issues ranging from decent working conditions to welfare and social 
security assurance etc. and creates a fair playing field for the proprietors. MLC – 2006 
is being referred as the “fourth pillar” of the IMO and it will compliment key 
conventions such as SOLAS, STCW and the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 73/78 (MARPOL) (Somavia, 2006)  
 The collaboration between ILO and IMO dates back to 1959 as under Article I and III 
the two organizations are to participate on things of common interest (ILO, 2010). A 
similar cooperation is seen between the two in addressing the human element, i.e. the 
Joint Working Group on the human element to address the role of the human element 
in shipping IMO (2009). Such participation between the two will lead to developed 
maritime safety, labor and social conditions in the industry.  Furthermore, Joint 
IMO/ILO Ad Hoc Expert Working Group on Fair Treatment of Seafarers and Joint 
IMO/ILO Ad Hoc Expert Working Group on liability and compensation regarding 
claims for death, personal injury and abandonment of seafarers are examples of the 
efforts in dealing with human element. In view of Doumbia-Henry (2010, p.2), the 
implementation of MLC – 2006 will give human element a “front and central role in 
the maritime industry.” 
 
1.3 SOLAS 
 
Among all international conventions that deal with maritime safety, the most significant 
is the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). Moreover, it is 
one of the oldest, the first version having been adopted at a conference held in London 
in 1914. Since then there have been four other SOLAS conventions: the second was 
adopted in 1929 and entered into force in 1933; the third was adopted in 1948 and 
entered into force in 1952; the fourth was adopted (under the auspices of IMO) in 1960 
and entered into force in 1965; and the present version was adopted in 1974 and entered 
14 
 
into force in 1980. All of the SOLAS conventions have covered aspects of safety at sea. 
The 1914 version, for example, included chapters on safety of navigation, construction, 
radiotelegraphy, life-saving appliances and fire protection (SOLAS, 1998).  
These subjects are still dealt with, in separate chapters in the 1974 version. The 1914 
Convention was, as implied by its title, concerned primarily with the safety of human 
life. The late 19th and early 20th centuries represented the golden age of passenger 
travel by sea: there were no aircraft, and emigration, from Europe to the Americas and 
other parts of the world, was still taking place on a massive scale. Traveler ships 
were hence much more common than they are nowadays, 
and mishaps habitually driven to overwhelming casualties (SOLAS, 1998). 
The yearly misfortune of life from British ships alone found the middle value 
of between 700 and 800 amid this period. The occurrence which driven to 
the assembling of the 1914 universal SOLAS conference was the sinking of the White 
Star liner Titanic on her maiden voyage in April 1912. More than 
1,500 travelers and crew passed on, and the fiasco raised 
so numerous questions about the safety standards in constrain that the United 
Kingdom Government proposed holding a conference to develop international 
regulations. The Conference was attended by agents of 13 countries and the SOLAS 
Convention which resulted was adopted on 20 January 1914. It introduced new 
international requirements dealing with safety of navigation for all merchant ships; the 
provision of watertight and fire-resistant bulkheads; life-saving appliances; and fire 
prevention and firefighting appliances on passenger ships (SOLAS, 1998).  
Other requirements dealt with the carriage of radiotelegraph equipment for ships 
carrying more than 50 persons (had the Titanic's distress messages not been picked up 
by other ships the loss of life would probably have been even greater); the Conference 
also agreed on the establishment of a North Atlantic ice patrol. The Convention was to 
enter into force in July 1915, but by at that point, war had broken out in Europe and it 
did not do so, in spite of the fact that numerous of 
its arrangements were embraced by individual nations. In 1927, be that as it 
may, propositions were made for another conference which was held in London in 1929 
(SOLAS, 1998). This time 18 countries attended. The conference adopted a new 
SOLAS convention new regulations. It entered into force in 1933. One of the two 
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annexes to the convention revised the international regulations for preventing collisions 
at sea (Collision Regulations).  
By 1948 the 1929 convention had been overwhelmed by United Kingdom once more 
facilitated an international conference which adopted the third SOLAS Convention. 
It taken after the as of now set up design but secured a more extensive run of ships and 
went into impressively more noteworthy detail. Imperative changes were made in 
such things as, watertight subdivision in passenger ships; stability standards; the 
maintenance of essential services in emergencies; structural fire protection, including 
the introduction of three alternative methods of subdivision by means of fire-resistant 
bulkheads, and the enclosure of main stairways. An international safety equipment 
certificate for cargo ships of 500 gross tons and above was introduced - an indication 
of the growing importance of cargo ships relative to passenger ships, which were 
already facing competition from aircraft (SOLAS, 1998). The Collision Regulations 
were moreover changed and controls concerning the security of navigation, 
meteorology and ice patrols were brought up to date. An isolated chapter was 
included managing with the carriage of grain and unsafe products, including the 
explosives. There had been considerable developments in radio since 1929 and the 1948 
Convention took these into account (the title of the relevant chapter made specific 
reference to radiotelephony as well as radiotelegraphy). The year 1948 was very 
important because a conference held in Geneva under the watch of the United Nations 
adopted a convention establishing IMO - or the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization (IMCO), as it was known back then (SOLAS, 1998).  
The 1948 SOLAS Convention recognized that the creation of this new Organization 
would, for the first time, mean that there was a changeless international body competent 
of receiving enactment on all things related to maritime security. It was initially planned 
that the Convention would be kept up to date by occasional alterations received beneath 
the auspices of IMO but within the occasion it took so long to secure the approvals 
required to bring the IMO Convention into drive that the new Organization did not meet 
until 1959. It was at that point chosen that instead of correcting the 1948 Tradition it 
would be way better to embrace a totally new instrument - the fourth SOLAS 
Convention (SOLAS, 1998) 
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The 1974 adaptation incorporates the implied acknowledgment strategy - which gives 
that a revision should enter into constrain on an indicated date unless, complaints to the 
correction are received, before that date, from a concurred number of Parties 
As a result, the 1974 Convention has been upgraded and revised on various occasions. 
The Convention in constrain nowadays is in some cases alluded to as SOLAS, 1974, as 
revised. (IMO, 2019). 
1.4 ISM 
 
Known as the International Safety Management Code, the ISM Code is one of the 
aforementioned required regulations in the marine industry. From the year 1994, it has 
been a very vital component of the SOLAS Convention (Safety of Life at Sea). It was 
in this year that this code was formally adopted and integrated as a part of the SOLAS 
Convention. 
In other words, it can be also highlighted that the ISM Code Shipping is an intrinsic 
part of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in its endeavors to guarantee, 
keep up and effectuate security for the seafarers as well as at the same time giving a 
pollution free zone for the division totally (ISM, 2014). 
It can be said that the code centers on bringing the perspective of marine security to a 
common platform for vessels of all nationalities. This dispenses with any disparities 
that might emerge approximately the maintenance of a much-needed safety protocol. 
According to the stipulations of the Code it is obligatory that all ships take after this 
code. In order to execute its fitting usefulness, the International Safety Management 
Code is supported by a Safety Management System. 
 This system, abbreviated as SMS, details the various requirements that need to be 
followed like: 
• Establishment of a managerial committee to oversee the various 
proceedings 
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• Ensure that the managerial officers carry out their outlined duties 
appropriately 
• Corroborate the differences between the outlined responsibilities and the 
actual performance to resolve them 
• Audit the vessel – both internally and externally so as to eliminate all 
possibilities of safety problems 
 
The perspective mentioned last comes beneath the ambit of Planned Maintenance 
System.  It is anticipated of each shipping organization that it carries out auditory 
analyses of its management system and implements the same, wherever missing. 
Whereas the internal auditing is carried out by the company itself, the external auditing 
is carried out, every second year, by the authorities of the nation where the vessel is 
enlisted to. On the off chance that the vessel has effectively consolidated all the safety 
prerequisites, at that point the authorities issue it with a Certification of Safety 
Management or the Safety Management Certificate which brings the complete chain of 
prepare to a productive completion (ISM, 2014). 
 
1.5 STCW 
 
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch-keeping 
for Seafarers, 1978 was adopted on 7 July 1978 and entered into force on 28 April 1984. 
The main purpose of the Convention is to promote safety of life and property at sea and 
the protection of the marine environment by establishing in common agreement 
international standards of training, certification and watch-keeping for seafarers (IMO, 
2019).  
 
1.5.1 STCW 78  
 
Before the adoption of STCW 78, maritime nations had diverse frameworks of 
preparing and certification, that were educated by their own national instructive, 
educational and professional approaches, driving to differing sea preparing strategies 
(Ashmawy, 2006; Morrison, 1997). In spite of the fact that, this demonstrated a 
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respectable begin, it may have not been perfect for the worldwide nature of shipping 
and its changing needs, that required a more unified maritime educational and training 
approach. Thus, the STCW 78 was first adopted on 7th July, 1978, with the goal of 
developing international standards of maritime education, training and certification and 
boosting professional standards of seafaring globally (IMO, 2011; International 
Transport Workers’ Federation, 2013). 
Contrariwise, International Transport Workers’ Federation (2013) posits that the 
STCW 78 tended to center basically on developing mariners’ knowledge. While the 
fulfillment of knowledge by seafarers is significant, it is additionally fundamental that 
they illustrate their adeptness in what they learn. Furthermore, it appears that the 
adoption of STCW 78 was centered on standards instead of practical desires 
subsequently, the likely reason for the location of its insufficiencies by IMO member 
States. 
 
1.5.2 STCW 95 
 
Ironically, it shows up that the STCW 78 did not resolve all the deterrents of 
accomplishing the required universality in MET and conferring professionalism in 
seafaring as expected. Subsequently, it was changed impressively in 1995 with the 
deliberate of tackling the insufficiencies of the starting STCW by complementing 
practical skills, abilities and competence, pivoted on theoretical knowledge and least 
required standards of competency (Worldwide Transport Workers’ League, 2013; 
Jorgens, 2012). In addition, concurring to Jorgens (2012), the 1995 changes were also 
made against the backdrop that the STCW 78 comprised various vague articulations 
that driven to shifted interpretations by IMO member States. Moreover, International 
Shipping Federation (2007) asserts that the STCW 78 was respected as a compromise 
between nations craving tall benchmarks and those concerned almost their capacity to 
influence its arrangements. In spite of the fact that the reasons for the amendment of 
the STCW 95 were justified, it unveils the challenges of defining ‘universal’ laws, 
especially because it relates to the IMO, which may emerge due to issues of national 
boundaries, sovereignty, accessibility of assets or specialized skill, subjective interface 
and assorted levels of comprehension.. Thus, it may be outlandish to anticipate that the 
STCW would be immaculate at any given time. Also, it may too be irrational to 
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anticipate its equal implementation by nations. However still, calculated compromise 
and mulled over included esteem may have guided agreement to the corrections. 
 
 
1.5.3 STCW 2010 
 
On the other hand, in spite of the well-intended reason of the STCW 95, it shows up 
that it was still inadequately to address the rising advancements inside the maritime 
sector. As a result, the most recent of the previously mentioned modifications, are the 
2010 amendments, also known as the “Manila amendments’ (IMO, 2011)  
In this respect, the 2010 amendments were planning to make improvements on the 
STCW, as corrected in 1995, by tending to recent technology, inconsistencies, 
translations and out-of-date arrangements (International Chamber of Shipping & 
International Shipping Federation, 2011; International Transport Workers’ Federation, 
2013; Jorgens, 2012). Subsequently, the Manila amendments emphasize seafarers’ 
competency and a competence-based approach to the training of seafarers (Fisher & 
Muirhead, 2013; Universal Shipping Alliance, 2011). 
The industry requires well qualified and high caliber seafarers competent of adjusting 
to alter and dealing with the wide extend of tasks presently required of them. Any 
training program given must guarantee quality isn't compromised within the journey 
for expanding quantity. In a sense, the 2010 Manila amendments appear to request that 
seafarers demonstrate their capabilities before they are formally employed on board 
ships. Usually coherent considering the current noticeable quality given to safe and 
secure shipping practices inside the maritime domain. Other than, with almost 90% of 
the world’s add up to exchange of merchandise in tons being transported by ocean 
(Shuo, 2014) and the potential dangers ocean disasters posture to human life, the 
environment and worldwide economies, it appears significant to have competent sailors 
on board ships. 
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1.5.4 Manila amendment requirements 
 
Subsequently the 2010 amendments: 
i) introduced modern training and certification prerequisites and techniques, 
ii) updated the measures of competency crucial in tending to rising technologies,  
iii) augmented instruments for authorization of its arrangements and 
iv) revised necessities on hours of work and rest, anticipation of drug and alcohol 
abuse and medical wellness standards for seafarers (IMO, 2011).  
 
Particularly, the Drewry Maritime Research (2014), the International Chamber of 
Shipping and the International Shipping Federation (2011), note that the Manila 
amendments contain the taking after modern preparing requirements: 
1) Improved methods to prevent false hones connected with certificates of competency 
and a fortification of the assessment handle (checking of parties’ compliance with 
the Convention), 
2) Revised necessities on hours of work and rest and unused necessities for the 
avoidance of drug and alcohol mishandle, as well as upgraded benchmarks relating 
to restorative wellness measures for seafarers,  
3) New certification prerequisites for able seafarers, 
4) New necessities relating to preparing in advanced innovation such as electronic 
charts and data frameworks (ECDIS),  
5) New necessities for marine environment training and preparing in authority 
(leadership) and teamwork,  
6) New training and certification prerequisites for electro-technical officers,  
7) Updating of competence necessities for personnel serving on board all sorts of 
tankers, including modern necessities for staff serving on liquified gas tankers, 
8) New necessities for security training, as well as arrangements to guarantee that 
seafarers are appropriately prepared to manage on the off chance that their transport 
comes beneath assault by pirates,  
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9) Introduction of advanced training technique including distance learning and web-
based learning,  
10) New training direction for staff serving on ships working in polar waters,  
11) New training direction for staff working and operating Dynamic Positioning 
Systems, and 
12) Refresher training to demonstrate seafarers have ceaselessly kept up their 
competencies 
 
1.6 ISO   
 
The International Standardization Organization (ISO) was shaped in 1947 as a 
nongovernmental organization with the reason of advancing, the improvement of 
guidelines to encourage the universal trade of products and administrations. It also will 
look for worldwide co-operation in scientific, mechanical, technological and financial 
activities. ISO comprises of approximately 100 nations as individual members in spite 
of the fact that its number keeps growing and these member countries are generally 
represented to in ISO by their national standard organizations (Madu, 1998). 
ISO is used as the brief frame for the International Organization for Standardization 
instead of 105. The term ISO is inferred from the Greek word 'isos' which suggests 
'equal,' therefore the utilization of equal standards as guidelines to direct the worldwide 
trade of merchandise and benefits (Madu, 1998). 
As defined by the Central Secretariat of ISO, the purpose of international 
standardization of facilitating trade exchange and technology transfer can be achieved 
through (Madu, 1998):  
1. enhanced product quality and reliability at a reasonable price 
2. enhanced item quality and unwavering quality at a sensible cost; 
3. improved wellbeing, security and environmental assurance and lessening of 
waste;  
4. greater compatibility and interoperability of products and services; 
5. simplification for progressed usability;  
6. reduction within the number of models and hence lessening in costs;  
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7. increased dissemination proficiency and ease of maintenance ('Introduction to 
ISO' from ISO Online). 
 
International standards serve a basic function in today's worldwide markets. They expel 
essentially, as ISO notes, 'technical boundaries to trade.' Such obstructions may be 
anticipated when there's no consistency in standards among comparable businesses and 
advances around the world. Progressively, countries within the same regions are 
adjusting themselves to secure their advertise turf and without standardization of 
industrial practices, it'll be greatly troublesome to compete exterior one's locales. 
Universal standardization is anticipated to proceed to develop in its popularity around 
the world (Madu, 1998) 
 
 
1.6.1 ISO 9001 
 
ISO 9001 alludes to quality management, which alludes to all those highlights of an 
item or service which are required by the client. Moreover, quality management, 
implies what the organization does to guarantee that its products or services fulfill the 
customer’s quality prerequisites and comply with any directions pertinent to those 
products or services. Quality management has to do, also, with what the organization 
does to improve client fulfillment to realize persistent advancement of its performance 
(Seifollahy, 2013). 
 
 
1.6.2 ISO 14001 
 
ISO 14001 alludes to environmental management. This implies what the organization 
does in purpose to play down destructive impacts on the environment caused by its 
activities and to comply to applicable administrative necessities. Moreover, company 
takes after ISO 14001, must proceed in progress of its environmental performance 
(Ramasubramanian, 2016). 
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1.6.3 OHSAS 18001 – ISO 45001 
 
The OHSAS 18001 (Occupational Health & Safety Management System) was published in 
1999, revised in 2007 and is one of the most recognized standards internationally for 
health and safety management systems at work. In some countries, the application of a 
health and safety management system to work is a legislative requirement. Recent 
developments in international systems standards have made it imperative to create a 
new ' ISO ' standard for health and safety at work – which in fact has a common 
structure and approach to international standards of management systems e.g. ISO 
14001:2015, ISO 9001:2015 etc. 
The OHSAS 18001 provides a structured approach to risk identification and 
management in order to help reduce accidents or other occupational health problems by 
establishing a safer working environment (Piotr Kafel 2016). ISO 45001 is the new 
international standard that defines the requirements of an H&A management system at 
work, published in February 2018, replacing OHSAS 18001. 
Main changes from OHSAS 18001 to ISO 45001 
• ISO 45001 will have a common structure, common terms and definitions with 
ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 
• This structure aims to facilitate the implementation process and the 
consolidation of various management systems in a harmonized, structured and 
effective manner. 
• Active participation and increased obligations of the organization’s high 
authority 
• Replacement of ' Hazard Identification ' with the term ' risk recognition ' (Risk 
Identification) to cover a broader field. 
• Expanding the word risk and how suppliers – subcontractors manage their risks. 
• Change the term "employee – workplace" There are also new definitions of 
terms such as: monitoring, measurement, efficacy, performance and process 
What is most significant to be mentioned is that ISO 45001 vs OSHAS 18001 brings 
up proactivity instead of reactivity. 
Both ISO 9001,14001 and 45001 are based on PDCA cycle and its process as follows:  
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Figure 1: PDCA Cycle 
 
Source: Author generated 
 
 
The PDCA cycle means:  
• “PLAN”: what you are in progress to do 
• “DO”: according to your Plan 
• “CHECK”: so that you see if it is done what was initially planned 
• “ACT”: alter or develop the part of your Plan or Do that did not give you the 
results you intended.  
 
 
The key concept that occurs is: “Say what you do and do what you say”. 
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1.7 Total Quality Management  
 
The logic of total quality management (TQM) in presently broadly diffused in all sorts 
of trade organizations, whereas its fruitful usage leads to an assortment of positive 
results or has vital suggestions for the receiving companies, since it targets at 
continuous change with the cooperation of all workers in order to guarantee inside and 
outside customer satisfaction (Sitkin et al., 1994). The significance of TQM is 
profoundly uncovered through the expanding number of scholarly ponders rising 
particularly after the early 1990s, in a time period when Dean and Bowen (1994) viewed 
total quality as “as a philosophy or an approach to management that can be 
characterized by its principles, practices, and techniques.” (p. 394). Concurring to Dean 
and Bowen (1994) the three standards of total quality are, customer focus, ceaseless 
enhancement and collaboration, whereas the practices encourage the implementation of 
the principles and incorporate the collection of client data or process analysis. At long 
last, these hones are at that point bolstered by a certain number of strategies and 
techniques. Besides, the presence of certain basic success elements for the usage of 
quality management systems, such as leadership, participation learning, process 
management, nonstop change, employee fulfillment and customer satisfaction, has also 
been recognized back in time (Anderson et al., 1994), driving a significant number of 
creator-writers to carefully assess the special practices that best characterize the 
complexities of a TQM framework (Dark and Doorman, 1996) 
 
 
1.7.1 TQM and organizational characteristics relationship.  
 
Numerous studies from the past, uncover that the size of a company (Gagnon & 
Toulouse, 1996; Germain, 1996) and principal ownership (Ahire et al., 1995) are related 
to management and administration activities in the implementation of TQM. 
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Figure 2: Modern Ship Management Equation with TQM characteristics 
 
Source: Author generated 
 
Organizational culture implies to attitudes, beliefs, and situational interactions. It has 
been impacted by diverse sorts of proprietorship. As a result, the degree of TQM 
utilization is diverse 
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2. TMSA 
 
During the last decades the shipping industry and especially the tanker industry has 
experienced a significant change in the direction to a quality orientated industry. It can 
be said that this was caused by the dramatic ship and especially tanker accidents in the 
1980s and -90s. This change in industry behavior has led to different tools in order to 
ensure quality with regard to a safe and environmentally friendly operation of vessels. 
Vetting of tankers is a crucial part of this, also the International Safety Management 
Code (ISM Code) must be considered as an important part of this new quality orientated 
industry. Furthermore, has the tanker industry established during the years the Tanker 
Management and Self-Assessment (TMSA) in order to ensure that the tanker operators 
are complying with the ISM Code and additionally to mandatory high-level tanker 
industry standards.  
TMSA guide is a tool created by OCIMF to help Tanker operators to assess and improve 
their SMS and is intended to encourage self-regulation and to promote continuous 
improvement.  TMSA brought along a new culture in the industry and achieved its goal 
since now almost all Companies management systems are more or less in compliance 
with the most advanced industry standards. Being a standard imposed by the Oil 
Majors, TMSA implementation is mandatory. In fact, it is a less flexible system than 
the one based on the ISM requirements, because ISM relies on international rules which 
may be rightfully challenged, whilst the TMSA compliance relates to auditors’ 
approach and instant behavior, which may well be arbitrary and non-negotiable 
(OCIMF, 2019) 
The TMSA has to be seen in connection with the before described tanker vetting. It was 
developed to include also the tanker operator into the vetting process. Turker (Turker 
& Er 2008, p. 129) stated that the need for a scheme focusing on the tanker operators 
was necessary due to the criticism which was given that the requirements of the ISM 
code were not being followed properly. According to Knowles (2010), the TMSA was 
originally developed by a single oil major, which was not further named, and then 
adopted by OCIMF as a best practice guide in 2004. In 2008, the TMSA was revised 
and, thus, a second version was published referred to as TMSA2. He also mentioned 
that: “OCIMF believes that TMSA2 provides a comprehensive and invaluable tool to 
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help ship operators measure and improve their safety management systems. It 
encourages ship operators to assess their safety management systems against listed key 
performance indicators (KPIs) as a guide and measure of best practice”.   
Within the above quotation the direct link between the TMSA and the ISM Code and 
its SMS respectively can be seen. In addition to this internal use for performance 
improvement of a ship operator, it has to be said that the TMSA, since its introduction, 
is playing a major role in the vetting process. Because this scheme gives, as mentioned 
above, the oil majors the first tool to assess the operator’s shore operation and has been 
playing a major role in the vetting process since its introduction. This does not mean 
that this had not been considered by the oil majors in the pre TMSA era. In fact, a ship 
operator’s management capability and performance is playing an important role in the 
vetting regimes since its appearance, but the TMSA allows the charterer to the judge a 
ship operator’s self-assessment, and, thus, the awareness of an tanker operator against 
his actual performance, as validated by the vessel’s inspections rather than to base an 
operator’s assessment only on the overall performance of his fleet. 
Knowles (Knowles 2010) states that an increasing number of vetting organizations and, 
consequently, charterers are requiring the TMSA. Furthermore, it is expected by these 
vetting organizations that the companies who are preparing the TMSA will use same 
for a performance measurement and consequently for the improvement of their shore-
based organization and specially to improve their SMS. Due to the fact that the TMSA 
encourage a continuous improvement it is not only a tool like the ISO standards, in fact 
it is, due to the continuous improvement, already in-line with the ISM Code, which is 
of course understandable because it was established to monitor a company’s ISM Code 
compliance.  
Whereas the tanker vetting is a compliance examination and is, therefore, done on a fail 
or pass basis, the TMSA audit should lead, through the attribute of continuous 
improvement, to a more systematic assessment by the oil majors. That implies that the 
TMSA audit cannot be done on a pass or fail basis because the self-assessment is 
evaluated, and, thus, it is inspected whether or not the ship-owner has incorporated the 
soul of ISM Code and continuous performance improvement or if he is just running his 
business on minimum requirements.  
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The TMSA is designed to help companies continually improve their SMS through 
regular self-assessment following the key components of a continual improvement 
cycle. 
 
                        Figure 3: Plan- Act- Improve- Measure Components 
 
Source: Author generated 
 
Sang (1998) emphasized the importance of measuring performance through 
performance indicators, stating "If you can’t measure it, you cannot manage it”. KPI is 
an objective performance tool that helps organizations find deficiencies, benchmark 
improvements, and maintain self-improvement (Parmenter, 2015). Performance 
indicators are a key component as a measuring tool for organizations because it is not 
possible to determine the success or failure of a performance goal if the achievement is 
not accurately measured. KPI is commonly implemented to monitor and review 
performance in practice (Reiman and Pietikäinen, 2012). Performance indicators are 
widely used in the shipping industry, such as shipping companies, ports, and 
administrations to measure performance for continuous improvement (Graziano, in 
press). 
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2.1 Hierarchy of indicators (The Shipping KPI Standard) 
 
The Shipping KPI Standard is built up hierarchical with 8 Shipping Performance 
Indexes (SPIs), 33 Key Performance Indicators and 64 Performance Indicators (PIs). 
There is a mathematical relation between SPIs (high level indexes) which are calculated 
from Key Performance Indicators, and KPIs which are calculated from Performance 
Indicators (lowest level).    
On the lowest level you find the PIs, which are based on data capture (measurements 
or counters) directly from a ship or from the shipping management. Data is collected 
once and re-used within the Shipping KPI Standard in order to reduce the amount of 
data (BIMCO, 2018). On KPI level a form of normalization take place. The KPI are 
scaled into a range from 0-100, where zero indicates unacceptable and 100 is 
outstanding performance. This makes it possible to compare ships with different 
characteristics or amount of data captured (BIMCO, 2018).  
Finally, on the highest level the KPIs are combining into Shipping Performance Indexes 
in order to express performance within specific main areas.  
 
2.2.1 Shipping Performance Indicators (SPI)  
 
The Shipping Performance Indexes (SPIs) are aggregated expressions of performance 
within a particular area. The SPIs are expressed as a weighted average of relevant KPI 
Ratings on a scale between 0 and 100. Some Key Performance Indicators (KPI) can be 
included in several SPIs. An example is the KPI Crew planning which is used in 
calculation of all SPI Ratings. The objective of the SPIs is to give external stakeholders 
information about the overall performance of a ship in one of the following areas 
(BIMCO, 2018).:  
• Environmental Performance 
• Health and Safety Performance 
• HR Management Performance 
• Navigational Safety Performance  
• Operational Performance 
• Security Performance  
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• Technical Performance  
• Port State Control Performance  
 
 
2.1.2 Key Performance Indicators (KPI)  
 
The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) are expressions of performance within a 
specific area. The KPI’s ratings will form basis for the Shipping Performance Index 
(SPI) score. The KPI’s can be expressed in two ways; a KPI Value which is a 
mathematical combination of relevant Performance Indicators Values and a KPI Rating 
which is an expression of the KPI Value on scale between 0 and 100 where a high rating 
(100) is a result of high/excellent performance. Some PI Values can be included in the 
calculation of more than one KPI Value. Examples of KPIs are: Budget performance, 
Dry-docking planning performance and Ship availability (BIMCO, 2018). 
 
 A KPI is:  
• a numerical, objective measure of performance 
• key to the strategic business objective  
• actionable and influenced by the relevant stakeholder/manager 
• accountable to stakeholder/manager 
• output oriented, not focused on input or activity 
• possible to calculate with limited efforts and within limited time  
 
 
 
The objectives of KPIs are to:  
• measure for continuous improvement 
• measure for internal and external benchmarking 
• measure to set incentives  
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                                Figure 4: KPI Focus 
 
Source: BIMCO, 2018 
The literature commonly divides KPIs into so-called leading and lagging indicators. 
Leading KPIs refer to measures for continuously monitoring identified inputs, which 
are needed to achieve a planned safety target and/or objective (Reiman and 
Pietikäinen, 2012). Lagging KPIs are measurements that perform reactive monitoring 
to identify e.g. when a planned objective or target has not been reached (Øien, 2001). 
In this study, KPIs are categorized into three groups based on Reiman and Pietikäinen 
(2012):  
• Drive indicators. The definition and monitoring of these KPIs focus on 
implementing and reviewing certain actions used to change, maintain and 
reinforce different elements of the system. Their main function is to guide 
the socio-technical aspect of the system by motivating certain safety-
related activities.  
• Monitor indicators. These are used for monitoring the function of the 
system, including but not limited to the efficiency of the safety 
management practices in the organization. Monitor indicators reflect the 
capacity of the organization to perform safely.  
• Outcome indicators. These reflect a temporary end result of a process 
and/or an activity in the SMS. An outcome is always the result or 
consequence of some other factor or combination of factors and 
circumstances. These indicators focus on the result or consequence of the 
tasks or processes in the organization. 
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The Key Performance Indicator (KPI) is built combining a set of PIs. As the KPIs is a 
mathematical combination of PIs no additional data gathering is required. In the model 33 
KPIs are defined. The KPIs are expressed in two forms: The calculated KPI Value and a 
conversion of the KPI Value into a 0-100 KPI Rating. (BIMCO, 2018).:  
The following KPI were defined: 
 
• KP Ballast water management violations 
• Budget performance 
• Cadets per ship 
• Cargo related incidents 
• CO2 efficiency 
• Condition of class 
• Contained spills 
• Crew disciplinary frequency 
• Crew planning 
• Dry-docking planning performance 
• Environmental deficiencies 
• Failure of critical equipment and systems 
• Fire and Explosions 
• Port state control performance 
• Health and Safety deficiencies 
• HR deficiencies 
• Lost Time Injury Frequency 
• Lost Time Sickness Frequency 
• Navigational deficiencies 
• Navigational incidents 
• NOx efficiency 
• Officer retention rate 
• Officers experience rate 
• Operational deficiencies 
• Passenger injury ratio 
• Port state control deficiency ratio 
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• Port state control detention 
• Releases of substances 
• Security deficiencies 
• SOx efficiency 
• Training days per officer 
• Ship availability 
• Vetting deficiencies 
 
 
 
2.1.3 Performance Indicators (PI)  
 
The Performance Indicators (PIs) are the building blocks giving the basis for KPI Value 
calculations. PIs are directly observable parameters (measurements) for each ship under 
management, e.g. Number of dismissals, Number of collisions and Number of fire 
incidents.  
 The Performance Indicators are the only elements that must be reported manually or 
by means of implemented ICT solutions. Focus has been to provide the hierarchy with 
unambiguous definitions of measurable low level parameters based on existing 
measurements in the industry. Each PI may be used in the calculation of several Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs). An example is the PI Number of recorded external 
inspections which is used as a denominator in the calculation of several KPI Values.  
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2.2 The TMSA3 ELEMENTS 
 
Following OCIMF (2019) guidelines there are 13 specific elements with which every 
company and vessel must comply.  
Element 1 and 1A– Leadership and the Safety Management System: 
 
 A statement of commitment from the company chief executive is a fundamental 
foundation of any safety management system. Element one acknowledges this fact and 
outlines the responsibilities of company management to develop and maintain a 
dynamic SMS that promotes excellence in the fields of health, safety, security and the 
environment (HSSE). The SMS should consist of clear and concise documented 
procedures that identify the roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for all staff, 
ashore and afloat. 
Element 2 – Recruitment and Management of Shore-Based Personnel: 
 
A mechanism to control the assessment of competence and certification of seafarers 
has, to some extent, been addressed with the introduction and continued revision of the 
IMO 1978 Standards of Training and Certification and Watch-keeping (STCW) 
Regulations (as amended). Element two of TMSA identifies the need for a similar 
approach to the qualification and appointment of shore-based personnel. A formalized 
pre-employment process should determine the suitability of applicants for all 
appointments to shore-side posts. The selection process should ensure that candidates 
are medically fit, technically competent, suitably qualified and experienced to 
undertake the roles for which they are recruited. Appraisal, training, continuous 
development and succession planning programs should be integral parts of the SMS. 
Personnel continuity, with an emphasis on staff retention and development are key 
factors in ensuring effective committed and motivated shore management. Personnel 
records should include a training portfolio for each member of staff, which can be used 
to ensure that they are kept up to date on recent developments within the industry. 
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Element 3 and 3A – Recruitment Management and Wellbeing of Vessel Personnel: 
 
The competence, motivation health and well-being of a ship’s crew are critical factors 
in ensuring the safe and efficient operation of any vessel. Pre-recruitment checks by the 
employer need to determine the accuracy of an applicant’s qualifications and 
experience. Pre-employment medical screening of crew members, such as those offered 
by the Association have been shown to significantly reduce claim costs for medical and 
repatriation expenses. Regular crew appraisal procedures adopted by an employer will 
help identify those individuals who work well as team and can be used to ensure crew 
members are provided with programs of continuous professional development suitable 
for their own, and the company’s objectives. Continuous appraisal should be used to 
identify and correct weaknesses in competence and to encourage and develop 
candidates for promotion. 
Element 4 – Vessel Reliability and Maintenance: 
 
Including Critical Equipment Robust and well applied repair and maintenance 
procedures are important in ensuring safe, efficient and reliable vessel operation. The 
ISM Code calls for additional control measures to be established for mechanical, 
electrical and other items of equipment that could, in the event of failure, result in a 
hazardous situation. This ‘critical equipment’ may include, but not be limited to main 
propulsion systems, steering gear and cargo handling equipment. Efficient planned 
maintenance systems (PMS) that incorporate defect reporting and close-out procedures 
will assist with maintaining a vessel’s classification status. Effective PMS should also 
ensure that suitable spares are available for the timely completion of planned work. 
There should be a close working relationship between a vessel’s crew and the 
designated superintendent. Regular vessel visits, including sailing visits, by 
superintendents reinforce this relationship. Procedures for out-of-service repair periods, 
e.g. dry-dockings, should be formally developed and involve close collaboration 
between ship and shore staff. 
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Element 5 –Navigational Safety: 
 
 Although the master is ultimately responsible for the safe navigation of the vessel, the 
company are obliged to establish and maintain navigational procedures that ensure the 
safety of the vessel. These are likely to reflect the content of publications such as the 
International Chamber of Shipping publication ‘Bridge Procedures Guide’, and ensure 
that navigational techniques appropriate to the circumstances of the voyage, are 
implemented fully. Implementation of industry best practices would include the regular 
conduct of comprehensive navigational audits, conducted on passage by suitably 
qualified and experienced personnel from the company. Company audits should be 
backed-up by and bench-marked with, independent audits performed by suitably 
qualified, specialist contractors. 
Element 6 and 6A – Cargo, Ballast, Tank Cleaning, Bunkering, Mooring and 
Anchoring Operations: 
 
The driving factor behind TMSA Elements 6 and 6A is the desire to ensure that on 
board operations associated with cargo, bunkering and mooring are conducted safely 
and efficiently. To that end, comprehensive procedures covering all aspects of the 
applicable operations need to be in place. Furthermore, those procedures need to be 
understood and applied by all relevant staff. Junior officers should be actively engaged 
in the planning and execution of cargo, bunkering and mooring operations, as part of 
their personal development plans. Crew members should receive suitable training prior 
to being placed in charge of cargo and ballasting operations, this may include the use 
of computer based or simulator training ashore. Mooring operations are a frequent 
source of personal injuries. These accidents are often caused by poor working practices 
and a lack of a proactive safety culture. Robust company mooring procedures will 
reflect the contents of the OCIMF Mooring Equipment Guidelines and information 
papers and the UK MCA publication ‘Code of Safe Working Practice for Merchant 
Seamen (COSWP)’, Chapter 26 – ‘Anchoring, Mooring and Towing Operations’. 
North of England’s Loss Prevention Briefings on ‘Mooring Operations’ and ‘Wire 
Ropes and Their Uses’ also highlight some best industry practices. 
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Element 7 – Management of Change: 
 
Change of any description within an organization or on board a ship introduces the 
possibility of additional risk. An evaluation of the impact that change may have on 
operational matters and procedural tasks will assist in identifying those areas that will 
be affected most. Suitable risk assessments will then be necessary to control the 
implementation of this process. COSWP Chapter 1 - ‘Managing Occupational Health 
and Safety’ – Annex 1.1 ‘Management of change’ - provides detailed instructions on 
how this should be carried out. Technical changes may require the provision of revised 
drawings, plus revisions to operational and technical manuals. Required changes need 
to be properly recorded and effectively linked with the vessel’s document control 
system. In this way important controlled documentation will remain relevant and up-
to-date. There should be a periodic review of all implemented changes, to evaluate the 
outcome of those changes and to measure the extent to which planned objectives have 
been met. 
Element 8 – Incident Reporting, Investigation and Analysis: 
 
 The fundamental principle underpinning Element 8 is that all incidents are preventable. 
Therefore, the company needs to have procedures in place that incidents and near 
misses are always reported, investigated and analyzed, so as to prevent recurrence. 
Incident investigation needs to delve down into the actual root causes. Measures to 
effectively eliminate the causes and prevent further incidents need to be implemented 
and promulgated. Element 8 highlights the importance of crew and shore staff involved 
in accident investigation receiving suitable training and support from the company and 
third-party subject specialists. Training programs should include suitable refresher 
training and this should form part of the individual’s personal training program. 
Company reflection and review practices must ensure that incident information and 
analysis findings are promulgated efficiently to the other vessels within the fleet and 
details are discussed with crew members during safety committee meetings and 
onboard training drills. 
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Element 9 and 9A – Safety Management 
 
 TMSA principles are intended to enhance the implementation of the spirit of the ISM 
Code and the adoption of a proactive safety culture on board. Monitoring the 
implementation of safety management systems requires a review by shore-based 
managers of working practices carried out on board. Completed risk assessments should 
be reviewed by technically competent company representatives. Common risk 
assessments should be introduced throughout the fleet. A comprehensive program of 
near miss reporting should be adopted. All of these measures serve to promote the safety 
culture on board. Best practices include the implementation of concentrated safety 
awareness campaigns, detailed procedures for the management of third party 
contractors and the employment of fleet safety trainers to conduct onboard training and 
to promote company values and safety culture. 
Element 10 – Environmental and Energy Management:  
 
Fundamental to effective environmental practices are the systematic identification, 
assessment and minimization of sources of marine and atmospheric pollution, and the 
environmentally responsible disposal of potentially damaging residual waste. 
Reference in company protocols to the requirements of MARPOL and/or national and 
regional limitations should be supported by regular reviews of action necessary to 
ensure present and future compliance. A long-term environmental plan should be 
maintained and reviewed and updated regularly. The environmental management plan 
should include fleet-wide energy efficiency and fuel management practices. Ship 
recycling practices should adhere to environmentally sound principles. 
Element 11 – Emergency Preparedness and Contingency Planning: 
 
An emergency response system that deals with shipboard and company emergencies 
needs to be established. The system requires regular and robust testing to ensure that is 
fit for the purpose of adequately responding to and dealing with incidents. Companies 
should develop a comprehensive program of drills that test the response to all 
foreseeable emergencies. A shore-based response team should be integral to a 
structured training program. Element 11 of TMSA identifies the need for media 
training, business continuity and recovery following a major incident Plans for incident 
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management must account for the twenty-four hour operational practices of most 
companies and provide shore-based emergency response personnel with the resources 
they need to manage an incident. Contact details for relevant members of company and 
external staff including third party salvage and towing specialists should be available 
to the person in charge. Designated members of the team should receive media training 
appropriate to their role, to ensure the control of information passed to the press. A 
relationship should be established with media professionals to support company staff. 
Realistic, regular and robust emergency exercises and drills should be undertaken that 
reflect the nature of vessel and fleet operation. Drills and exercises should be designed 
to test the effectiveness of arrangements to call on external personnel and resources.  
Element 12 and 12A – Measurement, Analysis and Improvement: 
 
 Perhaps the most important feature of any effective safety management system is the 
dynamic nature of its implementation. TMSA refers to an effective company SMS as a 
“living document at the core of the business”. Operators must strive to ensure their 
system manuals do not sit on the shelves gathering dust; they should be used as a tool 
in the daily operation of the processes and procedures they refer to. The effectiveness 
of that tool must be reviewed and assessed on a regular basis to make sure that it 
accurately reflects the nature of the work in hand and has not become outdated and 
irrelevant. Vessel inspections, checks on legislative compliance by ships’ crews, and a 
review of actions closed out following audit will all give an indication of how well the 
system is performing. A fleet standard format of inspection that satisfies the 
requirements of industry best practice guidelines should be used for internal audits 
performed on all vessels and shore support offices associated with the system. Staff 
members with responsibility for performing audits should be suitably experienced and 
given formal auditor training, a record of audits performed should be held for future 
reference by management and numbers of audits performed in keeping with those 
planned monitored. The effectiveness and status of corrective actions recommended in 
previous audits need to be assessed as part of this process and systems should include 
a documented process that can be used for this purpose. An analysis of inspection 
results and the operator’s ability to satisfy ISM requirements as well as regulatory and 
legislative amendments should form part of periodic management reviews of the SMS. 
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Element 13– Maritime Security  
 
The maritime security situation is dynamic and continually changing. In order to 
monitor and manage the changes the ship operator needs to have an effective security 
management system in place. The system should be such that threats to security in all 
areas of the business are identified and risks posed thereby are mitigated to the lowest 
practicable level. Security management should be included in the internal audit 
program. External specialist support should be provided to deal with identified threats 
as and when appropriate. Vessels should be provided with enhanced security and 
monitoring arrangements and provisions should be in place to consider, test and install 
innovative security measures onboard existing and new build ships where appropriate. 
Procedures should be implemented with respect to cyber security. These procedures 
should include the identification of threats to onboard and company electronic systems. 
The procedures should include guidance on cyber security awareness and measures to 
counteract threats posed by cyber-attacks. 
2.3 Generic Presentation of TMSA3 Innovation (Human Factor appearance in 
each element and stage)   
 
At each of the aforementioned elements, TMSA3 introduces a very significant and role-
playing factor, for the modern maritime industry. This is the “human factor”, and its 
appearance emerge in assorted ways through the KPIs and their Best Practice Guide. 
Table1: Element 1- Management, Leadership and Accountability 
Element 1: Management, Leadership and Accountability  
STAGE KPIs BEST PRACTICE GUIDE 
2.3  
Vessel and shore-based 
management teams promote 
HSSE  
excellence. 
Strong, effective leadership is visibly 
demonstrated 
through: 
• Leading by example. 
• Empowering personnel to intervene to 
prevent hazardous situations developing 
4.3  
All personnel demonstrate 
commitment to HSSE 
excellence  
Examples of commitment include participation 
in: A Behavior-Based Safety system.               
Managers and S/Ts demonstrate commitment 
by their behavior                                       
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Table 2: Element 2 - Recruitment and Management of Shore- Based Personnel 
Element 2: Recruitment and Management of Shore- Based Personnel  
STAGE KPIs BEST PRACTICE GUIDE 
1.1- 1.2  
Recruitment process ensures 
candidates for key shore 
positions have the 
appropriate qualifications, 
experience and competence 
This process includes interviews to asses 
competence. 
4.3  
The company promotes 
appropriate interpersonal 
skills training  
Training may include:                                                 
• Team Building                                                               
• Cultural diversity                                                       
• Effective communication 
 
Table 3: Element 3- Recruitment and Management of Vessel Personnel 
Element 3: Recruitment and Management of Vessel Personnel  
STAGE KPIs BEST PRACTICE GUIDE 
1.1 
 
 
Procedures for the section, 
recruitment and promotion of 
all vessel personnel 
Procedures, with rank specific requirements, 
may include:                                                                         
• A review of experience and competence by 
suitably qualified personnel                                                        
• Cross cultural values and attitudes 
2.4 
 
Procedures identify 
additional training needs for 
individual personnel  
The need for additional training may be 
identified by the following:                                                                
• Review of vessel performance trend                               
•Assessment of competence in rank or in 
preparation for promotion.  
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2.6 
 
The company monitors and 
records training results and 
effectiveness 
The effectiveness of training may be 
measured by:                 
• Feedback from trainees                                               
• Review of appraisals                                                               
• Review of vessel performance trends 
2.7 
 
 
There is a promotion 
procedure 
 
 
Procedures cover a range of factors including:                                               
• Competency assessment 
3.1 
 
 
 
Enhanced appraisals for 
Senior Officers 
Appraisals by appropriate personnel may 
include:                                                             
• Leadership                                                                     
• Personal Management                                                 
• Communications styles 
4.1 
 
 
Procedures to assess crew 
members for job competency 
 
Procedures may include:                                                        
• On the job observation                                                
• Written/ Oral/ Computer- based assessments                                            
• Scenario- based simulator assessments                                            
• Psychometric assessments 
4.3 
 
Cross- cultural interpersonal 
skills are promoted 
 
Interpersonal skills training include:                               
• Cultural awareness                                                                                           
• Cross- cultural management skills                                          
• Communications styles 
3A.3.1 
 
Seminars for senior officers 
promote, emphasize and 
enhance the SMS 
 
Regular seminars for Senior Officers include:                                                                               
• Company culture, ethics and values                                         
• Safety and human element 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
Table 4: Element 4- Vessel Reliability and Maintenance 
Element 4: Vessel Reliability and Maintenance  
STAGE KPIs BEST PRACTICE GUIDE 
4.5 
 
 
 
Engineering audits by  
a suitably qualified and 
experienced company  
representative while  
on passage.  
The purpose of the annual audit is to:  
• Assess the skills of the engineering team 
members.  
• Evaluate the effec8ve functioning of the 
engineering team.  
• Identify any addi8onal training needs, 
whether they are specific to an individual, a 
vessel, or a fleet wide need.  
 
 
Table 5: Element 5 - Navigational Safety 
Element 5: Navigational Safety  
STAGE KPIs BEST PRACTICE GUIDE 
3.2 
 
 
 
Senior Officers receive 
appropriate ship-handling  
training before promotion to 
Master or assignment to a 
new vessel type.  
Ship-handling experience is gained by 
training as a part of a competency 
development system 
3.3 
 
Navigational audits while on 
passage by a suitably 
qualified and experienced  
company representative.  
 
 
Assess the skills of the bridge team members.  
• Evaluate the effective functioning of the 
bridge  
team.  
• Identify any additional training needs.  
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4.3 
 
Competency assessment 
programs ensure that  
Masters and navigation  
officers maintain core and  
specialist skills.  
  
The assessment program, which may be 
simulator  
based, includes an assessment of:  
• Bridge team management behaviors.  
4.4 
 
 
Navigator officers  
undertake periodic  
refresher BRM simulator 
training.  
  
 
The training team composition reflects the  
nationalities of the bridge teams in the fleet. 
The BRM training is used to enhance the 
dynamics within bridge team members and to 
increase awareness of cultural diversity, 
communica8on style and hierarchy bias 
among the team.  
  
 
 
Table 6: Element 6 - Cargo, Ballast, Tank Cleaning, Bunkering 
and Mooring operations 
Element 6: Cargo, Ballast, Tank Cleaning, Bunkering 
and Mooring operations  
STAGE KPIs BEST PRACTICE GUIDE 
4.2 
 
Audits by a 
qualified and 
experienced company 
representative include 
observation of 
cargo, ballast, tank 
cleaning, bunker handling 
and mooring 
ops. 
Annual audits may look at: 
• Skills and proficiency levels of 
the personnel. 
• Leadership and effectiveness 
of team. 
• Identifying additional training needs. 
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Table 7: Element 9 -Safety Management- Shore based Monitoring 
Element 9: Safety Management- Shore based Monitoring  
STAGE KPIs BEST PRACTICE GUIDE 
3.2 
Proprietary safety tools 
are used to encourage 
hazard identfication 
and to improve 
safety awareness. 
Such tools may include: 
• Unsafe Act Awareness programs. 
• Behavior-based safety system. 
9A.1.2 
The company safety 
culture encourages 
all personnel to identify, 
report and address 
hazards. 
Procedures require that any identified hazards 
are addressed 
9A.2.1 
Intervention to prevent 
unsafe acts and conditions 
is encouraged. 
Safety intervention techniques may include: 
• Unsafe Act Awareness and intervention. 
• Stop work authority. 
• Safety observations. 
9A.3.1 
Procedures encourage the 
reporting of safety 
best practices. 
Personnel are actively encouraged to 
submit safety ideas by methods such 
as personnel competitions or 
individual recognition. 
9A.3.2 
Procedures measure and 
compare the strength of 
safety culture across the 
fleet to identify areas 
for improvement 
and to provide motivation 
to crew. 
Procedures measure: 
• Near miss reports. 
• BBS system observations. 
• Best practices identified. 
• Hazards identified. 
• Unsafe acts identified. 
• Safety suggestions. 
3.3 
Management identifies 
opportunities to strengthen 
the safety culture through 
interaction with fleet 
personnel. 
Examples of methods of interaction 
might include presentations via: 
• Safety themed seminars. 
• Telephone conferences. 
• Webinars. 
• Safety magazines. 
• Company produced videos. 
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4.1 
Leading and lagging 
indicators of safety 
performance are analyzed 
across the fleet and on an 
individual vessel basis to 
identify areas where the 
safety culture can be 
improved. 
The analysis is used to: 
• Identify weaknesses across the fleet. 
• Prioritise vessel for targeted training 
 
Source: Author generated 
 
 
2.4 TMSA 1-3 Evolution 
 
TMSA 1 & 2 focused on ensuring a minimum level of compliance for all the Tanker 
companies, by imposing a deterministic approach. At first sight, the differences 
between TMSA2 and TMSA 3 are the following:  
• Specialized questions of Oil Majors own questionnaires have been 
incorporated.  
• Frequent observations raised by TMSA auditors during Office audits have 
been implemented as new requirements.  
• Certain KPIs have been shifted to a lower stage, rendering their 
implementation elementary. 
 Last but not least, the level of difficulty has been raised and compliance to TMSA3 is 
definitely more laborious than TMSA2 compliance. But the real difference is that 
TMSA3 makes one step beyond by reducing the burden imposed by fixed term 
deterministic approaches, focusing on the Human Factors and Behavioral Safety, and 
promoting a competence management system as a tool for assessing crew competence, 
training requirements and managing from the crew selection process up to promotions. 
Summarizing the above, the basic and most important idea to be noticed is that, TMSA1 
was introduced to enhance Company Systems, TMSA2 to improve Company Systems, 
TMSA3 is clearly targeting Human Behaviors. 
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3. The Human Element and Safety 
When considering of safety, it is a common rule to refer to its absence. The conventional 
view of safety, called Safety-I, has, thus, been characterized by the non-appearance of 
mishaps and episodes, or as the ‘freedom from unacceptable risk” (Hollnagel, 2013). 
As a result, the focus of safety research and safety management has, as a rule, been on 
unsafe system operation rather than on secure operation framework. In controversy with 
the traditional view, resilience engineering maintains that ‘things go wrong’ and ‘things 
go right’ for the same fundamental purposes. In correspondence to the aforementioned 
view of safety, there comes Safety-II, which declares safety as the ability to succeed 
under varying conditions. The understanding of ordinary working is in this manner, a 
vital prerequisite for the understanding of the safety performance of an organization.  
3.1 The Causality Credo 
 
Consumption about how causes lead to effects should be included in any explanation 
of how accidents happen. These patterns are so called accident models. A well know 
accident model is the Domino model, despite the fact that it is as old as mankind itself. 
In the Domino model simple liner causality is shown by using the analogy of a set of 
domino pieces that drop one after the other. According to the logic of these models, the 
purpose of event analysis is to reason backwards from the injury to find the ‘root cause’. 
Risk analysis search if something may malfunction, meaning that a component may 
break or fail, either by itself or when combined with another malfunction 
Figure 5.: The domino Model 
 
Source: (Heinrich, 1931) 
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Simple, linear models were superseded in the 1980s by the composite linear models, 
where the best-known example is the Swiss cheese model. In accordance with these 
models adverse outcomes can be explained as combinations of active failures (or unsafe 
acts) and latent conditions (hazards). An event analysis hence looks for how debased 
boundaries or resistances can combine with active (human) mishaps. At the same way 
risk analysis centers on finding the conditions under which combinations of single 
failures and idle conditions may reach an unfavorable result, where the latent conditions 
are conceived of as debased boundaries or debilitated resistances. 
 
Figure 6: The Swiss Cheese Model 
 
 
Source: Reason, 1990. 
 
The Domino model and the Swiss cheese model are typical examples of accident 
models, 
but many others exist. Common to them all is the unspoken assumption that outcomes 
can be understood as effects that follow from prior causes. Since that corresponds to a 
belief – or even a faith – in the laws of causality, it may be called a causality credo. The 
causality credo can be expressed as follows: 
• Adverse results happen since something has gone off-base. Adverse outcomes 
have causes. 
• It is conceivable to discover these causes given sufficient prove is collected. 
Once the causes have been found, they can be dispensed with, typified, or 
something else neutralized 
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. 
• Since all adverse outcomes have causes, and since all causes can be found, it 
follows 
that all mischances can be anticipated. Usually the vision of zero accidents that 
numerous companies discover appealing (Reason, 1990). 
 
Whereas thinking in this way may be conceivable for frameworks that are moderately 
basic, it does not suffice for more complicated frameworks. And since most frameworks 
nowadays are complicated instead of uncomplicated, as recognized by Perrow as of 
now in 1984, the causality credo is not sustainable. 
 
 
3.2 Safety-I: Avoiding Things that Go Wrong 
 
To most people safety implies the nonappearance of undesirable results such as 
occurrences or mishaps. Safety is blandly characterized as the framework quality that's 
essential and adequate to guarantee that the number of occasions that can be hurtful to 
workers, the public, or the environment is acceptably low. ICAO (2013), for instance, 
defines safety as: “The state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property 
damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a 
continuing process of hazard identification and safety risk management”. 
 
Historically speaking, the beginning point for safety concerns has been the occurance 
of mischances (genuine unfavorable results) or recognized dangers (potential 
unfavorable results). Adverse results – things that go wrong – have ordinarily been 
clarified by indicating to their causes, and the reaction has been to either dispose of or 
contain them. New sorts of mishaps have additionally been accounted for, by presenting 
new sorts of causes – either relating to innovation (e.g., mental weariness), to human 
components (e.g., workload, ‘human error’), or to the organization (e.g., safety culture). 
Since this has been viable in giving brief term solutions, human through centuries, have 
ended up so usual to clarifying mischances in terms of cause-effect relations, that no 
longer notice it. And we cling relentlessly to this convention, in spite of the fact that it 
has gotten to be progressively difficult to accommodate with reality. 
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Figure 7: The imbalance between things that go right 
and things that go wrong 
 
 
1 - 10-4: = 9.999 non-failure 
in 10.000 events 
 
Source: ICAO (2013) 
 
The case where the (statistical) probability of a failure is 1 out of 10,000 is represented 
by the thin red line, in the above figure. But this moreover implies that one ought to 
anticipate things to go right 9,999 times out of 10,000 – comparing to the green zone. 
 
 
Safety efforts focus on what goes wrong, i.e., the one event out of 10.000, and this focus 
is reinforced in many ways. Controllers and specialists require detailed reports on 
mischances, occurrences, and indeed so-called unintended occasions, and uncommon 
organizations, offices, and organizational parts are devoted to scrutinizing adverse 
results. Numerous models claim they can explain how things go wrong and a 
considerable number of methods are offered to find and address the causes. Accident 
and incident data are collected in large databases (Hollnagel, 2015). Accidents and 
incidents are depicted and clarified in thousands of papers, books, and wrangled about 
in specialized national conferences. The net result may be a downpour of data both 
almost how things go off-base and approximately what must be done to anticipate this 
from happening. The common solution is known as ‘find and fix’: seek for breakdowns 
and failures, attempt to discover their causes, and after that dispose of causes and/or 
enlarge boundaries. 
 
The situation is quite different for the 9,999 events that go right. In spite of their crucial 
importance, they don’t really receive the appropriate attention in safety management 
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activities such as safety risk management, safety assurance and safety promotion. There 
are no requirements from authorities and regulators to look at what works well and 
therefore few agencies and departments that do it. Possible exceptions are audits and 
surveys, which may include a focus on strengths. However, information is not easily 
discovered, there are few models, and even fewer methods, and the lexicon is meager 
in comparison to that for what goes wrong. There are as it were few books and papers, 
and for all intents and purposes no meetings (Hollnagel, 2015). Looking at how things 
go right also clashes with the traditional focus on failures, and therefore receives little 
encouragement. This makes a genuine issue since we cannot make beyond any doubt 
things go right fair by anticipating them from going wrong. We moreover need to get 
to know how they go right. 
 
The current state of affairs represents a common understanding of safety, which we 
shall call Safety-I. This defines safety as a condition where the number of adverse 
outcomes is as low as possible. Since the purpose of safety management is to achieve 
and maintain that condition, safety goals are defined in terms of a reduction of the 
measured outcomes over a given period of time. Safety-I promotes a bimodal view of 
work and activities, according to which acceptable and unacceptable outcomes are due 
to different modes of functioning. 
 
When things go right it is as if the system functions as it ought to and because people 
work as envisioned; when things go wrong it is because something has failed or fizzled. 
The two modes are expected to be unmistakably diverse, and the reason of safety 
management is normally to guarantee that the system remains in the first mode and 
never wanders into the second.  
 
In Safety-I, the starting point for safety management is either that something has gone 
wrong or that something has been identified as a risk. The above-mentioned ‘find and 
fix’ approach is used in both cases. In the first one by finding the causes and then 
developing an appropriate response, and in the second one by identifying the hazards 
in order to eliminate or contain them. Preventing a transition from a ‘normal’ to an 
‘abnormal’ state (or malfunction) is another acceptable solution, regardless of whether 
this is due to a sudden transition or a gradual ‘drift into failure’. This can be finished 
by obliging performance within the ‘normal’ state, by strengthening compliance and by 
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dispensing with changeability. The last step is to check whether the number of 
unfavorable results (airproxes, runway attacks, etc.) goes down. On the off chance that 
nothing happens for a while, at that point the system is considered to be secure. From 
now on, Safety-I will be characterized by looking at its appearances, its basic 
components, and its hypothetical establishments. 
  
As it is proposed by resilience engineering, systems work because people are able to 
adjust what they do, to match the conditions of work. People learn to identify and 
overcome design flaws and functional glitches, they can recognize the actual demands 
and adjust their performance accordingly, interpretation and applied procedures are also 
made in order to match the conditions. 
 
People can also detect and correct when something is about to go wrong, hence 
intervene before the situation becomes grave. This can be described as performance 
variability, not in the negative sense of deviations from some norm or standard, but in 
the sense of the smooth adjustments that are necessary for safety and productivity 
(Hollnagel, 2013). 
 
 
Performance variability or performance adjustments are a sine qua non for the 
functioning of today’s socio-technical systems. Unacceptable outcomes or failures can 
therefore not be prevented by eliminating or constraining performance variability since 
that would also affect the desired acceptable outcomes. Instead efforts are needed to 
facilitate the necessary performance adjustments by clearly representing resources and 
constraints of a situation and by making it easier to anticipate the consequences of 
actions. Performance variability should be managed by attenuation (dampening) if it 
seems to go in the wrong direction and by strengthening (amplification) if is seems to 
go in the right direction. In order to do so it is necessary first to acknowledge the 
inevitability and necessity of performance variability, second to monitor it, and third to 
control it (Hollnagel, 2013). 
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3.3 Safety-II: Repeating things that go right 
 
The definition of Safety-II means that the manifestations are all the possible outcomes, 
as illustrated by Figure 8 and especially the typical or high frequency outcomes that 
usually are ignored by safety management. A system is still deemed to be unsafe if 
adverse outcomes occur, yet it is more important to understand how it is safe when 
things go right: safety is consequently defined by what happens when it is present, 
rather than by what happens when it is absent, and is thus directly related to the high 
frequency, acceptable outcomes (Hollnagel, 2015). 
Figure 8: Relation between event probability and ease of perception 
 
Source: Hollnagel, 2015 
 
 
In other words, the more manifestations there are, the higher the level of safety is and 
vice versa. This makes it conceivable to illustrate that endeavors to progress safety have 
worked, thus less demanding to contend for proceeded assets. (It also resolves the 
possible conflict between safety and productivity, but that is another matter (Hollnagel, 
2015). Few typologies are currently available in describing the manifestations of 
Safety-II. Even though things go right all the time, we fail to notice it because we 
become used to it. But since everyday performance is unexceptional, it can be explained 
in relatively simple terms. For instance, everyday performance can be portrayed as 
performance alterations that serve to make or keep up required working conditions, that 
compensate for a lack of time, materials, data, etc., which attempt to dodge conditions 
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that are known to be destructive to work. As a result, regular execution changeability 
is omnipresent, and it is less demanding to monitor and oversee.  
 
Juxtaposing Safety-I and Safety-II targets to draw attention to the consequences of 
basing safety management on one or the other. The basic differences are summarized 
in the table below. 
 
 
 
Table 8: Overview of Safety-I and Safety-II 
 SAFETY- 1 SAFETY- II 
Definition That as few things as 
possible go wrong. 
That as many things as possible 
go right. 
Safety Management 
Principle 
Reactive, respond when 
something 
happens or is categorized as 
an unacceptable risk. 
Proactive, continuously trying to 
anticipate developments and 
events. 
View of the Human 
Factor in Safety 
Management 
Humans are predominantly 
seen as a liability or hazard. 
Humans are seen as a resource 
necessary for system flexibility 
and resilience. 
Accident 
Investigation 
Accidents are caused by 
failures and malfunctions. 
The purpose of an 
investigation is to identify 
the causes. 
Things basically happen in the 
same way, regardless of the 
outcome. The 
purpose of an investigation is to 
understand how things usually go 
right as a basis for explaining how 
things occasionally go wrong. 
Risk Assessment  Accidents are caused by 
failures and malfunctions. 
The purpose of an 
investigation is to identify 
causes and contributory 
factors. 
To understand the conditions 
where performance variability can 
become difficult or impossible to 
monitor and control. 
Source: Author generated 
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Safety-I and Safety-II are two complementary views of safety. They do not clash or 
conflict with each other. What is more, the second completes the first. As a result, the 
existing practices can still be in use, but with a diverse emphasis 
 
A quick and summarizing benchmarking table, as follows below, will explain the 
evolution, brought up by Safety-II plus it will give prominence to the challenges and 
the facts, maritime industry should focus in the future. 
 
 
Table 9: Safety I and Safety II Benchmarking 
Safety I Safety II 
Learn from our errors Learn from our successes 
Safety defined by absence Safety defined by presence 
Reactive approach Proactive approach 
Understand what goes wrong Understand what goes right 
Accident causation Repeat what goes right 
Avoid errors Enforce successful behaviors 
Reduce losses Create new process on successful behavior 
Source: Author generated 
 
 
3.4 Safety II upside-down 
 
Looking at a successful performance is not enough so that we can say that Safety II is 
established. Safety II is referring to all possible outcomes, including the everyday, 
normal, routine performance. Near-miss accidents and catastrophes are equally 
involved so as exceptionally good performance. Our traditional approach, Safety-I, has 
largely limited itself to the latter – the accidents (actual or potential) at the tail end of 
the distribution. Safety-II is about the whole distribution, and its profile. But we 
normally ignore ‘normal performance’ (Shorrock, 2014). Focusing more on normal 
performance and targeting frequent events, is the way to improve system performance, 
because they can be easily altered and managed 
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3.4.1 Safety-II is not “just a trend” 
Most populist managements trends, are just trade-marked commercialism of nowadays 
or sometimes money-spinning packages. Unlike to them Safety II, is built in severe 
theoretical foundation. Decades of research and practice in safety, emerging resilience 
over the past ten years, plus human factors, are Safety II substances (Shorrock, 2014). 
Safety II is not condemned to disappear like other fads and trends as it is not one of 
them. Several major organizations and even regulators are starting to embrace the core 
ideas. 
3.4.2 Safety-II is not “a theory” 
Business used to be unfamiliar with theory due to the fact that theory is being mistaken 
with hypothesis or idea along with a kind of anti-intellectualism or anti-innovation 
mindset that rejects new thinking. Safety-II does comprise theory – on performance 
variability, trade-offs, emergence, etc (and if didn’t, then it should be discarded 
immediately) – and unapologetically so: as the saying goes, there is nothing so practical 
as a good theory. Theory – of systems, people, and time – provides a way of explaining 
and making sense of the world. So, Safety II is not a theoretical trend, neither “just 
theory” 
3.4.3 Safety-II is not the end of Safety-I 
 
It is a fact that through the past decades Safety I was the tool to establish SMS and it 
would not be wise to discard the practices based on Safety I assumptions. Safety II 
tends to complete Safety I, and “Many of the existing practices can therefore continue 
to be used, although possibly with a different emphasis” (Shorrock, 2014). The core 
assumptions of Safety-I (focus on failure, causality credo, human as hazard, bimodality 
of outcomes and decomposability of systems), should be taken into consideration, as 
also the extent to which they are valid with respect to the systems and situations in 
which we work. This does not necessarily mean abandoning practices that are founded 
on these assumptions, but perhaps modifying them and including new types of practice 
(but not ‘best practice’). 
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3.4.4 Safety-II is not about ‘best practice’ 
Dealing with complex systems we have to comprehend that there is no such thing as 
“best practice”. There is only practice implemented in the best way, in a certain context, 
at a certain time – the best that could be done, regarding the given assets the constraints 
and the demand. The best practice we can hope for is contextual practice – practice that 
fits the context. 
3.4.5 Safety-II is not what ‘we already do’ 
Several times, people say “Oh, yes, we already do that!”, having just been exposed to 
Safety-II thinking (perhaps a short presentation or a few pages of reading). “We already 
do that” often acts as a defensive shield to protect an existing paradigm, method or 
approach that is deep-rooted, cherished, and perhaps profitable. Often, “We already do 
that” practices are not really consistent with Safety-II thinking, though they may well 
be very useful and even progressive. But “We already do that” acts as a thought-stopper 
and prevents reflection about just exactly what it is that we already do, and – perhaps 
more to the point – why we do it (Shorrock, 2014). 
 
Safety II is based on the idea that performance, both good and bad, is systematically 
connected to the operational and organizational environment people work in. Given that 
perspective, instead of looking separately at compliance or standards, or to simply try 
and stay away from failures, the focus should be on identifying the aspects that help 
and hinder performance 
In ‘Safety II’, people are an asset, vital, for adaptability and resilience. But in times 
where human mistake is credited to the larger part of maritime casualties, the view of 
people as a defend and not a risk will be the foremost challenge. 
Positive reporting was not the field that the maritime industry used to focus on, in order 
to claim liability but care less on praising exceptionally good performance. As a result, 
there should be strong efforts and a considerable timeframe until there is a change of 
mentality 
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3.5 Safety Culture  
According to IMO (2003) safety culture can be defined as, “a culture in which there is 
considerable informed endeavor to reduce risks to the individual, ships and the marine 
environment to a level that is as low as is reasonably practicable. Specifically, for an 
organization making efforts to attain such a goal, economic and social benefits will be 
forthcoming, as a sound balance between safety and commerce will be maintained.” 
Safety culture is frequently seen as a subset of organizational culture where the values 
and beliefs allude particularly to things of safety and health (Clarke, 1999). The fields 
where safety culture and safety climate defer, as well as organizational culture and 
organizational climate isn't clear-cut. A few definitions of safety culture/climate 
concepts exist: Guldenmund (2000) records 16 definitions, but he proposes that safety 
climate alludes to the demeanors towards safety inside an organization, whereas safety 
culture concerns the fundamental beliefs and feelings of those states of mind. For the 
most part, the term safety culture is more embracing than that of safety climate (HSL, 
2002) and a safety climate can be seen as detecting surface highlights of employees’ 
demeanors and recognitions at a given point in time (Cox and Flin, 1998). The terms 
safety culture and safety climate are frequently utilized as equal (Cox and Flin, 1998). 
The Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (ACSNI) (HSC, 1993) 
has set the most widely used definition of safety culture: 
 “The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group values, 
attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety 
management. “ 
Communications founded on mutual trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of 
safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventive measures, is what characterizes 
most the organizations with a true positive safety culture 
The shipping industry is ran by people and for the people.  Thus, people tend to vary in 
all sorts of ways, as human beings, hey still have the same basic vulnerabilities and 
capabilities. Although weather and other factors are treated like simple elements, people 
are the center of the shipping enterprise. What is the secret of its successes and the 
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victims of its failures?  It’s the human element that drives what happens every day at 
work – from the routine tasks of a ship’s rating, right through to the policy decisions of 
the IMO. Human nature is well studied and fortunately a lot of practical things can be 
done so that people avoid pitfalls and enhance their strengths. 
Human behavior needs to be managed at all levels, ranging from ordinary seafarers to 
regulators developing national and international regulations.  It is these policies and 
strategies that govern how ships and their crews operate, how safely they operate and 
lead to success.   
Leadership and management are usually treated as the same thing. Although it is true 
that the most effective manager will almost certainly be an effective leader and that 
leading essential function of managers, there is more to managing than just leading. 
However, if managers do not know the way to lead people and how to comprehend the 
parameter of human factor in their operations, in a way so that desired results are 
produced, all the managerial functions are to accomplish little. 
Developing safety culture with the effective and correct application of human factors 
plays a vital role in the implementation of health, safety and environmental protection 
policies.  Safety culture as defined by Hale (2000) states as “The attitudes, beliefs and 
perceptions shared by natural groups as defining norms and values, which determine 
how they act and react in relation to risks and risk control systems.”   
The HSQE personnel in a company are entrusted with the responsibility and the task to 
monitor and develop the safety culture, so that the requirements of the ISM code are in 
compliance. 
3.6 Just Culture 
As said by Lord Denning English Judge: “There are activities in which the degree of 
professional skill which must be required is so high, and the potential consequences of 
the smallest departure from that high standard are so serious, that one failure to 
perform in accordance with those standards is enough to justify dismissal.”  
Don Norman (2013) at his book “The Design of Everyday Things” wrote: “People 
make errors, which lead to accidents. Accidents lead to deaths. The standard solution 
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is to blame the people involved. If we find out who made the errors and punish them, 
we solve the problem, right? Wrong. The problem is seldom the fault of an individual; 
it is the fault of the system. Change the people without changing the system and the 
problems will continue.” 
 
An engineering approach to “just culture” reference, involves the following 
• A just culture has zero resilience for rash behavior. 
• A just culture recognizes numerous mistakes speak to unsurprising intuitive 
between human administrators and the frameworks in which they work. 
Recognizes that competent experts make mistakes too. 
• A just culture recognizes that professionals should not be held responsible 
for system failings over which they have no control. 
• A just culture recognizes that indeed competent experts will create 
unhealthy norms. 
Three perspectives that create the Just Culture Model are: 
• Engineering  
• Human Factors  
• Legal 
 
 A Fair and Just Culture is always, a necessary component of a Culture of Safety. A 
Just and Fair Culture is one that learns and improves by transparent identification and 
examination of its own weaknesses; it is transparent in that those within it are as willing 
to expose weaknesses as they are to expose areas of excellence. Employees feel safe 
and protected, when in a just culture, when voicing concerns about safety and have the 
freedom to discuss their own actions, or the actions of others in the environment, with 
regard to an actual or potential adverse event. Human error is not viewed as the cause 
of an adverse event, but rather a symptom of deeper trouble in an imperfect system 
(Reason, 2008). When employees are involved in errors or mishaps, the leaders and the 
high authority are not judging so as to punish them, but in order to seek and find the 
hidden failures or the individual or system vulnerabilities. The above mentioned does 
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not mean that people are not accountable of their own actions, neither that discipline is 
not established, but this is to say that a Just Culture does not default to punishing 
individuals. In fact, one can say that a critical aspect of a Just Culture is the perceived 
fairness of the procedures used to draw the line between conduct deserving of discipline 
and conduct for which discipline is neither appropriate nor helpful. 
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4. Human Element Analysis 
 
A wide range of topics is covered by the term human element and can mean a variety 
of different things depending on the background of the user. It can variously be used as 
a synonym for “human factors,” “human resource,” or even “human error.” The human 
element covers a number of different academic disciplines, of which the most common 
are applied and/or occupational psychology, organizational behavior, ergonomics and 
human–computer interaction (HCI), safety science, business and management theory, 
health sciences, legal aspects, sociology, and anthropology. 
The most cited definition for “human element”, as it is applied in shipping, is probably 
the one adopted by IMO (2003) in its most recent resolution on the subject: A.947(23) 
in 2003 
The human element is a complex multi-dimensional issue that affects maritime safety, 
security and marine environmental protection. It involves the entire spectrum of human 
activities performed by ships’ crews, shore-based management, regulatory bodies, 
recognized organizations, shipyards, legislators, and other relevant parties, all of 
whom need to co-operate to address human element issues effectively. 
From the given definition, can be identified the reflection of the complexity and 
multidisciplinary nature of the subject, but, the deal between people and their working 
environment, is also emphasized. It is also indicated that the appliance of the term does 
not refer only to individuals working in a specific company, but also to different 
organizations in the sectors of the industry, and not only to ships’ crews, but also to 
shore-based staff. IMO has set a primary goal in addressing human element issues, the 
enhancement of maritime security, safety, and thus, the marine environment’s quality. 
 IMO’s main aim is described as: 
To provide a framework for understanding the very complex system of interrelated 
human element factors, incorporating operational objectives, personal endurance 
concerns, organizational policies and practices, and environmental factors, in order to 
facilitate the identification and management of risk factors in a holistic and systematic 
manner. (IMO, 2003). 
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Moreover, “human element” meets up with the ideas of individual, team and 
organization, both safety and human resource in a way explained in the table below 
Table 10: The different faces of the “Human Element.” 
  INDIVIDUAL TEAM ORGANIZATION 
SAFETY 
Accident Causation and Human 
Error 
Maritime 
Ergonomics 
Safety Culture 
Crew resource management (CRM) 
and crisis/ emergency management 
User- centered 
design concepts 
Organizational 
Culture 
Risk Management: System 
reliability and resilience 
engineering 
Human- Computer 
Interaction (HIC) 
Safety maturity 
models 
Training and assessment of 
competence 
Habitability 
issues: noise and 
vibration  
  
HUMAN 
RESOURCE 
Health, Well- being and Working 
Conditions 
HRM Practices Coorporate Social 
Responsibility 
Performance influencing factors 
(PIFs). For example, fatigue, 
alcohol and drugs 
Recruitment, 
selection,retention 
National cultural 
differences 
Performance Measurement     
Source: Author generated 
 
 
4.1 Human Factor issues 
 
Applying human factors to the design and operation of a ship or its systems means 
taking account of human capabilities, skills, limitations and needs.  Human Factors 
should not be confused with the term Human Resources, which is a closely related 
activity that addresses the supply of suitably qualified and experienced staff.  But when 
considering the operation or design of any ship and its systems both of these domains 
should be considered: 
• Human Factors to account for the use of people as a component of the system 
• Human Resources for the selection and preparation of staff able to do the 
required work.  
 Both domains contain a number of sub-domains:   
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Human Factors (Fitting the job to the person):  
• Human Factors Engineering – The comprehensive integration of human 
characteristics into the definition, design development, and evaluation of a 
system to optimize Human-Machine performance under specified conditions.  
• Health Hazards - The identification, assessment and the removal or reduction of 
short or long-term hazards to health occurring as a result of normal operation of 
a system.  
• System Safety - The human contribution to risk when the system is functioning 
in a normal or abnormal manner.  
 
Human Resources (Fitting the person to the job):  
• Manpower - the number of personnel required, and potentially available, to 
operate, maintain, sustain and provide training for a system.  
• Personnel - The cognitive (trainability and mental aptitude) and physical (fitness 
levels, physical size, gender) capabilities required of a person to train for, 
operate, maintain and sustain a system, and to provide optimum quality and 
quantity of the crews to man the ship.  
• Training - The instruction or the education, and on-the-job or part-task or full 
mission training required to provide personnel with their essential job skills, 
knowledge, values and attitudes.  
 Many human factor issues are also covered in the new IMO Maritime Labor 
Convention, which represents the “fourth pillar” of maritime regulation covering 
international shipping, alongside the Convention for the SOLAS; the Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL); and the Convention for the 
Training, Certification and Watch-keeping of Seafarers (STCW). 
Statistics show that the most common accident types for commercial vessels are, 
fire/explosions, mechanical problems, collisions, groundings and hull damages. 
Moreover, the pivotal cause for the occurrence of these accident lies on human behavior 
and performance; that is on human element. Its interference can militate on various 
procedures and event chains, causing more problems and provoking unpleasant 
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consequences, or on the other hand improving difficult situations and even preventing 
the escalation of threatening incidents (Martinez and Ventikos, 2016) 
Today, there are many human factors issues facing the marine industry that directly or 
indirectly influence the occurrence of human error. Some of the important ones are 
shown in the following figure. 
 
 
Figure 9: Human Factor Issues 
 
Source: Author generated 
Fatigue. 
 The NTSB has identified fatigue to be an important cross-modal issue, being just as 
pertinent and in need of improvement in the maritime industry as it is in the aviation, 
rail, and automotive industries. Fatigue has been cited as the “number one” concern of 
mariners in two different studies. A new study has objectively substantiated these 
anecdotal fears: in a study of critical vessel casualties] and personnel injuries, it was 
found that fatigue contributed to 16% of the vessel casualties and 33% of the injuries.  
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Inadequate Communications 
 Another area for improvement is communications--between shipmates, between 
masters and pilots, ship-to-ship, and ship-to-VTS. An NTSB report stated that 70% of 
major marine collisions and allisions occurred while a State or federal pilot was 
directing one or both vessels. Better procedures and training can be designed to promote 
better communications and coordination on and between vessels. Bridge Resource 
Management (BRM) is a first step towards improvement.  
Inadequate General Technical Knowledge 
 In one study, this problem was responsible for 35% of casualties. The main contributor 
to this category was a lack of knowledge of the proper use of technology, such as radar. 
Mariners often do not understand how the automation works or under what set of 
operating conditions it was designed to work effectively. The unfortunate result is that 
mariners sometimes make errors in using the equipment or depend on a piece of 
equipment when they should be getting information from alternate sources.  
Inadequate Knowledge of Own Ship Systems 
A frequent contributing factor to marine casualties is inadequate knowledge of own 
ship operations and equipment. Several studies and casualty reports have warned of the 
difficulties encountered by crews and pilots who are constantly working on ships of 
different sizes, with different equipment, and carrying different cargoes. The lack of 
ship-specific knowledge was cited as a problem by 78% of the mariners surveyed. A 
combination of better training, standardized equipment design, and an overhaul of the 
present method of assigning crew to ships can help solve this problem.  
Poor Design of Automation 
 One challenge is to improve the design of shipboard automation. Poor design pervades 
almost all shipboard automation, leading to collisions from misinterpretation of radar 
displays, oil spills from poorly designed overfill devices, and allisions due to poor 
design of bow thrusters. Poor equipment design was cited as a causal factor in one-third 
of major marine casualties. The “fix” is relatively simple: equipment designers need to 
consider how a given piece of equipment will support the mariner’s task and how that 
piece of equipment will fit into the entire equipment “suite” used by the mariner. 
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Human factors engineering methods and principles are in routine use in other industries 
to ensure human-centered equipment design and evaluation. The maritime industry 
needs to follow suit. This topic is discussed further in a subsequent chapter.  
Decisions Based on Inadequate Information 
Mariners are charged with making navigation decisions based on all available 
information. Too often, we have a tendency to rely on either a favored piece of 
equipment or our memory. Many casualties result from the failure to consult available 
information (such as that from a radar or an echo-sounder). In other cases, critical 
information may be lacking or incorrect, leading to navigation errors (for example, 
bridge supports often are not marked, or buoys may be off-station).  
Faulty standards, policies, or practices 
This is an off-cited category and covers a variety of problems. Included in this category 
is the lack of available, precise, written, and comprehensible operational procedures 
aboard ship (if something goes wrong, and if a well-written manual is not immediately 
available, a correct and timely response is much less likely). Other problems in this 
category include management policies which encourage risk-taking (like pressure to 
meet schedules at all costs) and the lack of consistent traffic rules from port to port.  
Poor maintenance 
Published reports and survey results expressed concern regarding the poor maintenance 
of ships. Poor maintenance can result in a dangerous work environment, lack of 
working backup systems, and crew fatigue from the need to make emergency repairs. 
Poor maintenance is also a leading cause of fires and explosions.  
Hazardous natural environment 
The marine environment is not a forgiving one. Currents, winds, and fog make for 
treacherous working conditions. When we fail to incorporate these factors into the 
design of our ships and equipment, and when we fail to adjust our operations based on 
hazardous environmental conditions, we are at greater risk for casualties. 
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4.2 Human Error 
 
Today’s ship systems are technologically advanced and highly reliable. Yet, the 
maritime casualty rate is still high. Why is it, with all these improvements, we have not 
significantly reduced the risk of accidents?  It is because ship structure and system 
reliability are a relatively small part of the safety equation.  The maritime system is a 
people system, and human errors figure prominently in casualty situations.  About 75-
96% of marine casualties are caused, at least in part, by some form of human error.  
Studies have shown that human error contributes to:   
• 84-88% of tanker accidents  
• 79% of towing vessel groundings  
• 89-96% of collisions  
• 75% of allisions   
• 75% of fires and explosions     
 
Therefore, if we want to make greater strides towards reducing marine casualties, we 
must begin to focus on the types of human errors that cause casualties. One way to 
identify the types of human errors relevant to the maritime industry is to study marine 
accidents and determine how they happen. These events are not usually caused by a 
single failure or mistake; more specifically, they represent a sum of errors.  
Therefore, marine accidents do not occur due to one human error. Usually, there are a 
lot of small mistakes that accumulate and may produce large-scale consequences. Error 
causation can be attributed to defects in design, procedures, training, maintenance, or 
management at the “blunt end” (Sheridan, 1992), even though most applications have 
focused on the “sharp end” (e.g., pilot, driver, surgeon, soldier, or other machine 
operator). Most often, causation is manifested as a lack of timely and sufficient 
feedback to the human or machine that “errs.” Alternatively, a person with an incorrect 
mental model of how a system works is likely to err in using it. Mental workload, 
emotional stress, or physical incapacitation of one kind or another surely contributes to 
error. For automation that can be operated in two or more modes, inadvertent operation 
in one mode, concurrent with belief that the system is in a different mode, is a common 
cause of error. 
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Some authors proposed an analytical foundation for human factors analysis and 
classification system where they characterized the role of human errors. Their results 
yield the following conclusion: the skill-based errors are on the first level for causing 
the accidents. It comprises the incompetence of engine room personnel; followed by 
the lack of preconditions such as coordination, communication and planning, 
disorganization and maintenance. To define the level of ‘nearest’ the accident, it 
understands human errors and violations. There are three error types and two forms of 
violations. The error types include the skill-based error described as operating skill that 
occurs with little conscious thought. The second is the rule-based (decision) errors 
which are the action or in-action of an individual who does not have the knowledge and 
makes wrong choices. The latter is knowledge-based (perceptual) error when the 
individual perception is different from reality. This results in illusions and spatial 
disorientation.  
Figure 10: Error types 
 
Source: Author generated 
 
On the other hand, violations consist of routine/infractions that consider routine 
violations, optimizing violations, and situational violations. From the psychological 
aspects, the preconditions for the level of ‘nearest’ the accident are also treated in two 
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directions. The first is the substandard condition of humans (crew members) which 
considers adverse mental state of a member, followed by the adverse psychological 
state and physical/mental limitations. The second is a substandard practice of crew 
member categorized as crew resource mismanagement and personal readiness. 
 
4.3 Human Reliability 
 
The human characteristics are the human constraints for achieving tasks. There are 
constraints such as: humans seen as a whole component or composed of separate 
subcomponents; humans are overloaded or under-loaded; humans are hypo-vigilant; 
humans are not experienced etc. The factors that may affect the system performance 
are numerous and correlations between factors have to be identified in order to simplify 
their integration into a human reliability assessment. Moreover, the main difference 
between humans and machines is the possibility that humans do not respect voluntarily 
a given prescription for specific reasons due to organizational factors for example, or 
to create new tasks or functions by using the technical resources differently. In such 
cases, humans are not repaired or changed, but they adapt their own behaviors to 
specific or usual constraints they have to control.  
Therefore, the definition of human reliability may be adapted as the ability of a human 
component to:  
1) realize successfully the prescribed tasks in given operational conditions over an 
interval of time or at a given time and  
2) not to realize additional task that may affect the performance of the human-
machine system in terms of, for instance, safety, production, quality, or 
workload 
 
As we note past experiences indicate that human behavior plays a crucial role in the 
success of an engineering system. Some of the typical behaviors are the following: 
• Human are often quite reluctant to admit mistake  
• Humans often overlook or misread instructions labels  
• Most people fail to recheck specified procedures for mistakes  
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• Humans frequently respond irrationally in emergency situations  
• Humans normally carry out tasks while thinking about other things 
• Humans are normally poor estimators of clearance, distance, and speed  
• A significant proportion of humans become quite complacent after successfully 
handling hazardous or dangerous items over a long period time 
• People frequently use their hands first to test or explore 
• People get easily confused with unfamiliar things 
• Generally, people regard manufactured items as being safe  
• Usually humans tend to hurry at one time or another.  
 
Other important factor in the reliability of an individual performing is the stress. There 
are basically the following four types of occupational stressors:  
• occupational change-related stressors  
• occupational frustration-related stressors 
• workload-related stressors 
• miscellaneous stressors. 
 
Human reliability assessment has always been a critical issue for safety and researchers, 
decision makers, safety engineers and practitioners. The reasons of that the HRA 
method, are subjective and the data concerning human factor, is impreciseness. The 
first probabilistic HRA studies were performed after Second World War to assess 
weapon system feasibility (Swain, 1990). Thereafter, the technique has adopted to the 
different industries such as nuclear power plant (Zubair and Zhijian, 2013), engine 
system (Chang et al., 2010), electronic system (Liang and Wang, 1993) defense 
industry (Hausken, 2008), manufacturing (Bertolini et al., 2010), transportation 
(Calhoun et al., 2014; Guo et al., 2012) and etc.  
 There have been a variety of HRA techniques developed to assess human reliability. 
The most of techniques based on empirical studies such as THERP- technique for 
human error rate prediction (Swain and Guttmann, 1983), SLIM- success likelihood 
index methodology (Embrey et al.,1984), ATHEANA- a technique for human error 
analysis (Cooper et al., 1996), HEART- human error assessment and reduction 
technique (Williams, 1988), CREAM- cognitive reliability and error analysis method 
73 
 
(Hollnagel, 1998), SPAR-H -simplified plant analysis risk human reliability assessment 
(Gertman et al.,2005) since human error data is scarce in the literature. Therefore, it is 
quite tough to apply stochastic models such as Bayesian Network (Almond, 1992) or 
Markov chain (Mennis et al., 2006) in order to predict human error probability (HEP).   
 In the context of human reliability assessment in marine industry, the researchers are 
quite limited. For instance, Yang et al. (2013) discussed a modified CREAM method 
by integrating Bayesian reasoning model. The method was demonstrated with an 
illustrative example of analyzing an oil tanker cargo oil pump shut down scenario. 
Likewise, another study was conducted by Martins and Maturana (2013) as a marine-
case in conjunction with HRA.  
Furthermore, HRA focuses on the “sharp end” of anomalous events and is only 
suggestive of safety considerations higher up the causation hierarchy of policy, 
procedure, software and hardware design, and management. 
 
Summarizing the above written, human reliability is a cause of concern as hardware 
becomes increasingly reliable and relatively human error is rising in its share of causing 
an accident. Hence, the need to increase the safety of these systems calls for addressing 
human reliability. 
 
4.4 Resilience 
 
Companies and organizations are trying to develop reliable safety systems. So, they 
emphasize in the risk perception. There are, different points of view at risk. For 
example, if a company assumes of having a good safety program in place and it’s 
compliant, it should better have a good culture of perception of risk on board too. And 
it’s a great need to be across the board, from the Master to the Chief Engineer to the 
CEO and the MD. Otherwise, the result is ending up in a situation: compliance induced 
complacency and thinking well of achieving safety but not really having it. And then, 
when safety fails - because safety does fail, even with the best loss prevention programs 
in place, when having an incident, thus not having the ability to react to it, then, the real 
question will be: is there the ability to “get up” and continue operations? When 
somebody falls off the bike does he stay on the ground? Is he resilient enough to get 
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up? When running shipping business, it’s very important to self-evaluate if you are an 
egg as a company, or you are like a tennis ball. Is there the ability to bounce, react and 
continue operations? 
 Furthermore, the significant idea, as implementing safety procedures, is the ability to 
recover. Safety is an incomplete cycle, if not having the ability to recover and continue 
operations. The term resilience is of outmost importance not only for the shipping 
industry but for every business. 
Resilience as a concept was introduced in the early 1970s and was originally defined 
as an ecological system’s ability to arrive at an equilibrium, or stable state, over time in 
a dynamic and changing environment (Holling,1973). In the context of STSs (human 
operators, technology and organizational settings), resilience is the ability to sustain 
required operations and achieve system goals under a large variety conditions, 
including anticipated and unanticipated events. Within the framework of resilience 
engineering, four cornerstones (monitor, respond, anticipate, and learn) are used to 
characterize and analyze system performance in the light of normal operations and 
disturbances. The focus is on the adaption of performance to the current operating 
conditions, with an emphasis on positive examples (Hollnagel, 2014), i.e. situations 
where the system successfully manages to meet production goals through adapted 
performance. Another line of research developing from resilience engineering with 
practical implications, are the concepts of safety-I and safety-II (Hollnagel, 2014). 
These two concepts represent different approaches to safety management in high 
hazardous industries. They represent complementary perspectives on how to define, 
measure, monitor and improve system safety in these industries. Safety-I is often 
associated with a traditional approach to safety based on quantitative risk assessment, 
while safety-II is associated with the theoretical concept of resilience and qualitative 
inquiries into how safety can be identified as the result of successful performance 
(Hollnagel 2014).Within the maritime domain, the research conducted with focus on 
resilience, safety-I and safety-II is, to the best of our knowledge, sparse and foremost 
limited to research concerning frontline operations and safety construction in everyday 
operations (Praetorius and Hollnagel, 2014) as well as addressing using resilience 
engineering to offer alternative explanations of the concept of human error (Lutzhoft, 
Sherwood-Jones, Earthy, & Bergquist, 2006). Further, the methodological approaches 
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range from simulator studies (Morel & Chauvin, 2006) to qualitative inquiry as a basis 
for functional modelling (Praetorius, Hollnagel and Dahlman, 2015) 
 
As outlined above, many of the safety-related efforts within the maritime domain focus 
on improving safety in accordance with a safety-I perspective. This section will 
therefore in contrast discuss how resilience engineering may contribute to a paradigm 
shift towards a safety-II perspective in the maritime domain. Following the capsizing 
of the Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987, the International Safety Management (ISM) 
Code (IMO, 2014) was introduced to the shipping industry. The main task of the Code 
is to clarify the role and the influence of shore-based and ship-based issues/factors in 
shipboard operations. This was probably one of the few accidents that has led to a 
systematic review of the STS ‘ship’ from a holistic perspective. The Code contains a 
few statements that can be used as an argument for the introduction of a safety-II 
perspective. Companies are required to provide for safe operational practices and 
develop related policies A designated person (DP) responsible for the implementation 
of the safety management system (SMS) has to be appointed with direct access to the 
highest management level (paragraph 4). It is furthermore stated that the ISM Code has 
a self-regulatory nature (IMO, 2014). However, the ISM Code is deeply rooted in 
safety-I paradigms. Companies are required to proceduralism the main functions and 
operations and thus directly pushed in a 'work as imagined' perspective. In the IMO 
context where a stronger focus is laid on the global eradication of sub-standard shipping 
this is an understandable objective. Certification guidelines for administrations require 
objective evidence (IMO, 2014), which typically is written procedures, documents etc. 
This cannot be avoided, but limits the flexibility of a company. The IMO recognizes 
that prescriptive criteria used by administrations for the verification of the 
implementation of the Code are counterproductive (IMO, 2014). ‘ 
  
 
 
One popular metaphor of resilience is the common stress-strain curve of solid 
mechanics. Many physical materials, when stretched by an external force (strained) 
from some length A, to a new length B, develop an intermolecular stress that enables 
the material to return to its original length when the external force is removed (in other 
words, a perfect spring). But when stretched beyond an elastic limit C, the 
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intermolecular stress will “give” and not increase linearly with stretch. In that case, 
when the external force is released, the material will not return to the original length 
but returns to a different point D. Stretch in terms of human or organizational behavior 
is analogous to imposed task load, and intermolecular stress is analogous to mental 
workload or organizational stress. For mechanical engineers, it is critical to know what 
the elastic limit is in terms of applied force or stretch, and for the safety engineer, it is 
critical to know the elastic limit in terms of task load and accompanying mental 
workload or stress. 
 
Figure 11: Stress-strain metaphor for resilience 
 
Source: Hollnagel & Rigaud, 2006 
 
On the basis of generalizations published in the literature (Hollnagel & Rigaud, 2006) 
one may summarize as follows the management responsibilities necessary to maintain 
a resilient system: 
 
• Emphasis on anticipating future possible incidents and on what actions were 
mitigating of negative consequences and aided recovery for past incidents 
• Continuous measurement of system state variables (how “close to the edge” of 
safety boundaries) 
• Appreciation of how formal policies and procedures differ from but 
nevertheless relate to the realities of worker actions; creation of a climate for 
openness to reporting and mutual respect between management and workers 
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• Encouragement of people with less status or authority to check on and make 
suggestions to those with greater status or authority 
• Consideration of organizational mental workload, a measure that is already in 
common use for individuals and teams operating under stress. It is worth noting 
that a mental workload measure, even though it is likely to be subjective, is a 
better predictor of failure than a (more easily quantifiable) measure of system 
performance itself because an increase in mental workload anticipates a 
decrement in performance. 
• Motivation and flexibility of a system: to learn and adapt. Flexibility 
presupposes sufficient training of both managers and workers so that they 
understand their nominal system (procedures, shortcomings, alternative means 
of recovery) and have confidence that they can improvise if necessary. 
• Willingness to temporarily relax the efficiency goal for the safety goal when 
circumstances suggest doing so (e.g., an aircraft go-around, a spacecraft launch 
“scrub”) 
• Development of understandable abstract models of the workers, the team, 
and/or the organization that include representation of the salient control inputs 
and performance outputs and the relation between the two, to keep everyone in 
the organization “on board” 
• Resource preparedness: ensuring availability of resources needed for serious 
anomalous events should they occur 
• Top-level commitment to safety: willingness to invest in safety and keep 
imagination (of failures) active even without a recent history of accidents. The 
danger is that when a system is apparently operating smoothly and safely, the 
organization will lower its guard, and incentive for investment in safety will 
decline. 
 
If resilience can be defined as the ability of the system to adjust its performance prior, 
during and after an unexpected event, a system must have the ability of being proactive. 
In a wider context, proactivity may indicate an early stage identification of problems or 
factors that may affect safety together with the development of regulatory actions 
before an accident occurs. 
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 Even with robust data in hand, healthy communities can’t be expected to anticipate all 
of the surprising, nonlinear ways in which systems behave when they are disturbed, any 
more than the experts do. What is needed is an inclusive way of thinking about various 
possible, probable, and preferable futures and their implications. Here again, new tools 
and technologies promise to help communities and organizations map critical 
thresholds, rehearse the consequences of disruption before they occur, and make better 
choices. (Zolli, 2013) 
 
 
4.5 Human Resource Management 
 
Human resource management (HRM) refers to the practices, systems, and policies that 
influence the behavior, performance, and attitudes of employees. Human resource 
practices include selecting human resource needs, screening, recruiting, training, 
rewarding, appraising as well as attending to labor relations, safety and health, and 
fairness concerns (Dessler, 2007). The recent years has shown a growing interest in the 
management of knowledge-based organizations. The effective implementation of HR 
practices in organizations is a key source of competitive advantage and has a positive 
relationship with organization performance (Collins, 2006). Studying topics of modern 
management, which includes recruitment and selection, training and development and 
the factors affecting the practice, is a new concept to developing countries.  
 
Human resource management involves both strategic and comprehensive approaches 
to managing people, as well as workplace culture and environment. The role of human 
resources professionals is to ensure that a company’s most important asset, its human 
capital, is being nurtured and supported through the creation and management of 
programs, policies, and procedures, and by fostering a positive work environment 
through effective employee-employer relations. The concept behind human resource 
management is that employees who are subject to effective human resource 
management are able to more effectively and productively contribute to a company’s 
overall direction, thereby ensuring that company goals and objectives are 
accomplished. 
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The traditional method of human resource management involved planned exploitation 
of staffs. The new function of human resource management involves HRM Metrics and 
measurements and strategic direction to display value. Under the influence of giving 
away the traditional method, HRM has got a new terminology called Talent 
Management. 
Human Resource Management functions can be of three types like Operative, 
Managerial, and Advisory as shown in the figure below. 
 
Table 11: Functions of Human Resource Management 
Functions of Human Resource Management 
Operative Functions 
Managerial 
Functions 
Advisory Functions 
• Recruitment 
 
• Training and 
Development 
 
• Professional 
Development 
 
• Compensation and 
Benefits 
 
• Performance 
Appraisal 
 
• Ensuring Legal 
Compliance 
 
• Planning 
 
• Organizing 
 
• Directing 
 
• Controlling 
 
• Top Management Advice 
 
• Departmental Head advice 
 
Source: Author generated 
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4.5.1 Human Resource Management Practices 
 
The activities performed by human resources teams should directly correlate with HR 
practices. If they don't, the disconnection can illustrate the concept of being up a creek 
without a paddle: It is possible to function this way, but it is not very effective. Thriving 
HR departments exist as fine-tuned watercraft impelled to harvest and prepare the best 
catch within their capabilities.  
Human resources practices are strategic in nature. They represent a vital guidance 
system that coordinates with an executive business plan. HR practices form the 
foundation, supporting the way a company’s human capital will operate on their behalf. 
HR activities embody the directives set forth through HR practices. HR activity 
examples include engaging in taking competitive surveys to ensure your workers are 
fairly compensated and managing employee attendance and overtime. Further HR 
activity examples include recruitment, hiring and firing and the administration of health 
benefits. 
 
Some of the most important and top listed HR practices are the following: 
 
1. Safe, Healthy and Happy Workplace 
2. Open Book Management Style 
3. Performance Linked Bonuses 
4. 360 Degree Performance Management Feedback System 
5. Fair Evaluation System 
6. Knowledge Sharing 
7. Highlight Performers 
8. Open House Discussions and Feedback Mechanism 
9. Rewards 
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4.5.2 Organization performance  
 
What is more, one of the main issues, focuses on the determinants of organization 
performance. Scholars from different backgrounds have explained organization 
performance and identified the sources of inter-organization performance differences. 
Organization performance is determined by measuring the actual outputs of an 
organization against its intended outputs (i.e., goals or objectives). According to 
Richard, Devinney, Yip, &Johnson (2009), organization performance comprises three 
areas of company outcomes, namely, financial performance (return on assets, return on 
investment, and profits), product market performance (sales and market share), and 
shareholder return. Organization performance also refers to strategic planning, 
operations, finance, legal, and organization developments. Several researchers relate 
organization performance to financial performance, which involves budgets, assets, 
operations, products, services, and markets (Thurbin, 1994).Some researchers identify 
several non-financial outputs that also contribute to organization performance, namely, 
management quality (De Waal and Frijns, 2011), long-term orientation (Steiss, 2003) 
continuous improvement (Arsad, 2012), workforce quality (Storey, 1989), and 
openness and action orientation (Pathak et al., 2005).  
 
 
4.5.3 Recruitment and selection  
 
Recruitment is the process of gathering qualified applicants for available positions 
within an organization (Mathis, 2004) and deciding whether to employ the qualified 
applicants or to reject them. Selection involves choosing the most suitable applicants 
who satisfy the requirements for a particular job. The practice of selection is a decision-
making activity or a psychological calculation of appropriateness (Price, 2004). 
Organizations that adopt appropriate selection processes are guaranteed to hire 
employees with the right skills and levels of confidence for a particular job. Some 
researchers found that prerogative recruitment and selection practices positively affect 
organizational performance (Harel & Tzafrir, 1996). Delaney and Huselid (1996) found 
that effective recruitment and selection processes positively affect organization 
performance. By studying the employee recruitment, retention, and performance 
strategies in the Nigerian civil service, Gberevbie (2010) emphasized the importance of 
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adopting appropriate employee recruitment and retention strategies to improve 
organizational performance. Other researchers suggested that a significant and positive 
relationship exists between recruitment/selection and organization performance 
(Gberevbie, 2010).  
 
4.5.4 Training and development  
 
Training and development are important elements of HRM (Vlachos, 2009). 
Organizational performance may benefit from training and development in several 
ways (Subramaniam et al., 2011). Training is a marshaled activity that aims to impart 
instructions or information to improve the performance, knowledge, or skills of the 
trainee. Development refers to the activities that help individuals attain new knowledge 
or skills that are necessary for their personal growth. All-inclusive training and 
development programs help trainees to focus on the skills, attitudes, and knowledge 
that are necessary to achieve goals and to generate competitive advantages for an 
organization. Apospori, Nikandrou, Brewster, and Papalexandris (2008) found that 
training has a significant effect on organizational performance. Subramaniam et al. 
(2011), argued that training and development could influence the performance of an 
organization because the skills, knowledge, and abilities of employees could be 
improved continuously. AL-Qudah, Osman, Ab Halim, and Al-Shatanawi (2014) stated 
that a significant relationship exists between training and development and 
organizational performance. Investment on training and development could produce 
huge benefits for an organization. Several researchers have reported that training can 
positively affect productivity, and employees and employers can receive mutual 
benefits from training (Conti, 2005). A significant relationship between 
training/development and organizational performance was also established in several 
studies (Subramaniam et al., 2011; AL-Qudah et al., 2014) 
 
4.5.5 Human resources Management (HRM) in maritime affairs 
 
In addition to the before mentioned facts related to human resources management, it 
should be noted that all of the above can be applied to companies in the maritime sector. 
The study of human resource management in shipping includes staffing on board, which 
presents a specific, isolated environment whose working conditions cannot be 
83 
 
compared with usual operating conditions. The problem of managing people on board 
is specific due to the fact that the management of the shipping company is not directly 
present on board, but the management function is performed by officers of the highest 
rank (captain and chief engineer). The specifics of the working environment have led 
shipping companies to organize additional training covering individual work outs with 
candidates. The above includes a day-long psychological evaluation with feedback and 
situational training such as decision-making in times of crisis or emergency situations, 
issuing commands, allocating of business load or handling the ship. Among other 
things, candidates should acquire knowledge and abilities related to leadership skills, 
personal stability, and sociability or cooperation with the crew. Special attention is paid 
to the management of a multicultural crew, and a perspective on other cultures is set 
from the Western point of view. At seminars, the officers are instructed on existent 
means of describing, comparing and understanding of cultural and ethnic characteristics 
and differences. Such an approach should help officers in gaining deeper knowledge of 
different cultures, resulting in the improvement of the monitoring and management 
style. Diversity is manifested in attitudes, priorities, norms, beliefs and behavior.  
 
In the ship’s management, the workforce is the primary factor. Although saving on the 
crew is the easiest way to reduce the costs of companies by importing cheaper labor, 
one should keep in mind that people are a key factor in maritime affairs breakdowns 
(Baker, McCafferty, 2005). Training can improve the skills of seamen, but no training 
can help if the wrong person is selected. Therefore, it is essential to choose the right 
candidate for the right tasks. Successful shipping companies create a sense of 
belonging, while in the lower-rated the crew is mainly motivated only by money 
(Barsan et al., 2012). There are two basic approaches to the management of human 
resources. On the one hand is a classic staff management in which people are considered 
to be a cost to the company. Another approach is the modern HRM (Human Resources 
Management) that is broader than the previous one, and in which the people are viewed 
as a benefit to companies because they can contribute to competitiveness through 
technological and financial capital (Bilici et al., 2012). In this process, the right 
selection 
of personnel is considered critical, but it includes more than just recruitment, and staff 
(crew) 
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are monitored at all stages of their careers. The very process begins by the candidate’s 
application for a job at the shipping company, after which follows a thorough and 
rigorous assessment, testing and examination of various knowledge and making 
decisions about employment. After the employee’s arrival aboard their work is valued 
through the existing system of evaluation, i.e., the results at ship training, or in other 
ways, which results in termination of employment, or progression and reward. 
 
 
4.6 Leadership 
 
The culture of an organization is defined by the beliefs and capabilities of the leader. 
In a time of accelerated change, organizations often look to leaders for guidance, as “in 
most companies, digital acceleration comes as a top-down ambition” (Camille Egloff, 
2016). High quality leadership and excellent change management, therefore, is crucial 
for the success of the environmental and digital transformations in the maritime 
industry. “Leaders must manage the change or it will manage them. Weak leadership 
provides no guidance. It confuses people, demotivates them and creates poor working 
environments. 
Leaders need to achieve their goals via their team members’ work. When leader’s team 
shines, leader shines. This is a significant mindset change, as it often means leaders 
need to subordinate ego or personal recognition to satisfy direct reports’ needs, and to 
have a high performing team that can respond effectively to ever-changing work 
demands. The development of others is now proportionate to, or even greater than, a 
leader’s own development. Clear goal setting and actively enabling team members is 
essential. How a leader treats his team is essential, too. Actively working to engage his 
talent will reduce turnover risk. Employee engagement and retention can be increased, 
by addressing three areas that get to the heart of what really matters to your team: 
• Meaningful work: Assist team members in understanding how their unique role 
makes a difference. Agree on clear goals that link to the organization and their job. 
Support access to data and information needed to be effective. Empower, give 
freedom  
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• Positive environment: Show the team they work in a great place. Ask for respect 
for the contributions of others. Ensure collaboration for group goals. Make sure to 
treat each other fairly. 
• Individual value: Appreciate and encourage team members. Support direct reports, 
don’t control. Acknowledge their efforts towards their goals. 
 
One of the most common pitfalls of organizations is promoting great technical experts 
into leadership roles and assuming they will automatically be successful. Leadership 
requires training and actively developing behaviors that your team values. Many of 
these behaviors tend to not feel natural, and new leaders are very rarely versed in all of 
them. More specifically, in these stressful times of volatility, uncertainty, and 
complexity, exceptional communication skills are required. And trust to set goals and 
then leave people alone. Trust time, trust space, and trust the team will contribute to 
achieving the goals that the organization sets. 
 
 
 4.6.1 Leadership styles 
 
According to the Silva (2014), there are differences within academia regarding the 
variety of styles of leadership. Some researchers believe that leadership style is essential 
further noting that the best style is not static but should be adapted to the situation. On 
the other hand, others believe that changing leadership style is impossible or should be 
avoided (Lewin, Lippit & White, 1939) 
 
Moreover, there is a belief, that the most important thing is not the style but the essence 
of leadership. There are also different opinions about the subject between academia and 
the wider industry and organizational life. For instance, some researchers believe that 
leadership style focusing on task is better than leadership style focusing on employee 
(Mitchell, Biglan, Oncken & Fiedler, 1970), leading to the development of different 
models of situational leadership (Hersey, Blanchard & Johnson, 2001).  
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The following are the ten popular leadership styles  
 
1. Autocratic leadership 
According to the Cooper (2008), autocratic leadership is controlling, and telling 
workers and/or followers what and how to do things. If it is used over time, it causes 
lack of trust and respect and prevents workers from thinking creatively and taking 
risks and creates conditions of fear through critical feedback. This style generally 
neither motivates workers positively nor increase loyalty (Cooper, 2008). On the 
other hand, Autocratic leaders provide clear expectations for what needs to be done 
and clear division between their followers. This could be best applied to the 
situation where there is little time for decision making with team, or leader is the 
most knowledgeable person in a group (Lewin, Lippit & White, 1939). 
 
2. Bureaucratic leadership 
Bureaucratic leaders work by following closely rules and procedure. This style is 
suitable for working in high risk environments, such as working with machinery, 
handling dangerous cargoes or working at dangerous heights (IMO, 2014). On the 
other hand, the disadvantage of this style is that it is ineffective on teams or 
organizations that rely on flexibility, creativity or innovation. 
 
3. Charismatic leadership 
A charismatic leader inspires enthusiasm and generates energy to lead others 
forward. In general, people tend to willingly follow this kind of leader. However, 
there is the risk that this style of leadership breeds inappropriate self-confidence 
and self-centeredness because followers believe that achieved success is highly 
attributable to the leader. A charismatic leader bears heavy responsibility, and there 
is a tendency for followers to leave things to the leader (IMO, 2014). 
 
4. Democratic or participative leadership 
This type of leader invites members to participate in decision-making, even though 
they take responsibility for the final decision. Members can feel involved and 
respected and individual development is encouraged. Indeed, it takes time to reach 
decision. However, it is likely to result in a satisfactory outcome (IMO, 2014). The 
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disadvantage of this style is that this type of leader can appear indecisive or 
unwilling to make a decision and decision-making is time consuming. 
 
5. Laissez-faire leadership 
The laissez-faire leader takes a back seat. They let their followers make their own 
decisions and give them freedom to work in the way they deem best. This can be 
applicable when leading experts and to facilitate creativity. However, it can lead to 
a lack of direction, a lack of urgency and followers’ frustration when overused 
(Cooper, 2008). 
 
6. Task-oriented leadership 
A task-oriented leader focuses on tasks at hand, and all procedures necessary to 
achieve the task. This style of leader is less concerned about catering to employees 
and more concerned with finding progressive technical/operational solutions to 
achieve goals. A disadvantage associate with this style is that there is a possibility 
for workers to have their motivation decreased if they feel powerless to control any 
aspect of their jobs. 
 
7. People-oriented or relation-oriented leadership 
A leader with this style understands the importance of tasks, but also uses a 
tremendous time and focus on meeting the needs of employees involved in these 
tasks. This may include offering incentives, such as bonuses, providing mediation 
to deal with conflicts, spending individual time with employees to learn their 
strength and weakness, or just leading in an encouraging manner. A possible 
disadvantage is that if employees receive too much responsibility without 
management guidance, the decision making can be overwhelming. 
 
8. Transactional leadership 
Transactional leadership motivates followers by appealing to their self-interest and 
exchanging benefits (Yukl, 2013). The transaction is that work will be done in 
return of payment and other rewards. The leader has a right to penalize followers 
who do not meet the particular standard. (IMO, 2014). Transactional leaders can 
seem impersonal. The leader may see employees as completely replaceable, 
because the leader only focuses on the completion of tasks. Transactional leaders 
88 
 
don’t see employees as individuals with personal needs. As a result, moods, 
emotions and fatigue may become irrelevant to managerial decision making about 
productivity. 
 
9. Transformational leadership 
The transformational leader can effectively inspire the followers with shared vision 
of the future and encourage enthusiasm for situations to be changed (IMO, 2014). 
The 
transformational leader appeals to the moral values of followers by attempting to 
raise 
their consciousness about ethical issues (Yukl, 2013). However, this leadership 
style may lead to relying too much on emotion and passion and overlook truth and 
reality. 
 
10. Servant leadership 
A leader with this style is often not formally recognized as the leader. When 
someone 
leads simply by meeting the needs of the team, he/she is described as a servant 
leader 
(IMO, 2014). There are a number of disadvantages of servant leadership. One 
distinct disadvantage is the use of time. It takes time to implement this philosophy. 
Typically, an entire organization has to undergo a paradigm shift towards servant 
leadership. It starts at the top of organization, but change has to be made all 
throughout the organization. 
 
 
4.6.2 Task-oriented Leadership vs People-oriented Leadership 
 
Task-Oriented leadership places an emphasis on getting a very specific job done. This 
system of leadership can be described as autocratic. Autocratic leaders make decisions 
without consulting their team. Task driven leadership requires its leader to have a clear 
definition of productivity and roles required. Task-oriented leadership does not place 
the well-being of staff members as its main priority. Performance goals and deadlines 
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are what motivate task driven leaders to succeed. Since autocratic leaders don't typically 
consult their team before making a decision, the task-oriented style can be beneficial 
since it allows decisions to be made very quickly. This is helpful in crisis situations, but 
it may lead to employees feeling disenfranchised. 
The people-oriented approach is the exact opposite of the task-oriented approach. The 
people-oriented approach involves supporting and developing people in their team. 
This style requires a high level of participation from leadership. People-orientated 
leaders consider how their decisions will affect others and weights their decisions 
heavily against any final action. Democratic leadership is characterized by the leader's 
willingness to allow team members to provide input on decision making. This form of 
leadership requires a high level of communication with staff members. Everyone feels 
ownership of the decision that is taken, which equates to much greater buy in. On the 
downside, it can take an incredibly long time for a decision to be made and there may 
be conflict as people with competing viewpoints try to have their opinions heard. 
 
It is extremely difficult to access the effectiveness of leadership styles on a company. 
Some researchers have argued that the influence of leaders on an organization is 
overrated. Although task- and people- orientated approaches to leadership contrast 
greatly, the effects of these two styles on a company's performance are basically 
identical. Generally, organizations will be content as long as team members have some 
sort of leader to guide them. Choosing a leadership style is not a simple process. Leaders 
are expected to guide and motivate team members to perform at an acceptable level. 
There is no single leadership style that will guarantee the success of a business. 
Nevertheless, a chosen style is needed so that allows to convey direction and maintains 
the authority. 
 
4.6.3 The leadership development process 
 
Leadership development is a lifelong process and the necessary skills are not for senior 
management personnel only. Leadership skills are necessary for everyone who has 
responsibility for others. Human beings are keen observers and mimics. We learn by 
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observing and replicating what we see around us, acquiring good and bad habits by 
watching and copying others (Jeffery, 2007).  
According to Bell (2012) “even the most experienced leaders should always expose 
themselves to new ideas, confront new challenges, and rethink their leadership style”. 
Robert (2005) states that it is becoming increasingly clear that experience is the best 
teacher of leadership development. 
 Devitt and Holford (2010) suggested that international maritime industry has unique 
aspects which make it difficult to apply the concept of leadership training in other 
industries into the maritime context. The reasons he gives are indicated below; 
• Development and maintenance of situation awareness on sea passages, differing 
from the regulation and control present within aviation. 
• Ships’ teams ‘hand over’ to each other at regular intervals and are augmented 
as required. This does not routinely happen outside the maritime industry. 
• Communication, including the use of interventions and challenges. Ships’ teams 
can more culturally diverse, with less utilization of standard communication phrases. 
• Organizational, professional, departmental and national cross-cultural issues 
associated with the globalization of the maritime industry. 
• Leadership and teamwork are impacted by the duration of the working 
relationship. The transitory nature of ships’ crew, where teams are constantly changing 
due to leave rotations, can differ from other industries. 
• Dynamic workload issues onboard a vessel operating routinely are influenced 
by external environmental factors, voyage duration, cargo operation and administration 
requirements and available support mechanism. 
 
4.6.4 Leadership on-board 
 
For good leadership, traits such as maturity, bearing, fair-minded, tact, justice, integrity, 
confidence, coolness, goodwill, and candor must be the guiding light. Bellefontaine 
(2008), in this regard notes that emotional stability and intelligence and passion are key 
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traits for a superior leadership. Finally, Northouse (2004) maintains that good leaders 
respect and serve others, build good cooperation, and promote impartiality. In this 
respect, it is submitted that all these crucial traits are essential for maritime officers’ 
leadership style. Nonetheless, from the above discussion, conclusions may be drawn 
that perhaps there is no perfect leadership style that might be suitable for all sorts of 
situations. Therefore, the effectiveness of the leadership style depends on the demand 
of the situation; particularly, in the maritime working environment, which implies high 
risk for accidents, harsh weather and working conditions, extra responsibility, increased 
fatigue and stress, and social isolation. Thus, the Autocratic style of leadership may be 
only appropriate where decisions need to be made quickly and decisively, as well as 
when total absence of discipline exists among subordinates. As a result, although 
maritime officers, as leaders, should be generally characterized by an autocratic 
leadership type, yet, young maritime officers’ behavior is sometime inappropriate and 
ineffective; because, on board a ship is not only the senior officer alone who needs to 
be viewed as a leader, but also petty officers, cadets and sailors too need to demonstrate 
good leadership if the ship as a whole is to perform exceptionally (Richard, 2007). 
Richard (2007) also asserts that the ‘big stick’ must be avoided by a good leader, and 
that instead, recognition, respect and encouragement must be promoted among crew 
members. Additionally, excellent leadership depends basically on constituent 
cooperation and support, successful delegation of the authority and on the 
communication effectiveness (Platow at al, 2007) On the other hand, the pre-dominated 
view is that the Democratic style appears to be more suitable for good leadership 
(Dixon, 2003), but in changing situations may be ineffective towards rapid decision-
making (Bellefontaine, 2008). Similarly, in spite of the fact that Laissez Faire style 
might embrace effective traits necessary for a good leadership, this approach may again 
offer minimum direction and discipline, particularly, for emergency situations 
 
4.7 Fatigue 
 
Fatigue can occur to anyone. It is not related with the skill or capability of the person. 
However, a strong person can withstand work pressures better and fatigue will come in 
him much later than a weak person. Same goes true with his mental strength. Out at 
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sea, the conditions are tougher and most people working out there are bound to have 
some fatigue issues. When the fatigue goes high beyond his tolerance, it can have 
disastrous effect on the work which can result into accidents and creation of dangerous 
situations. Lot of work is done by IMO to mitigate and manage the fatigue of seafarers.  
 
Dictionary meaning of fatigue is, “Extreme tiredness resulting from mental or physical 
exertion or illness”. With fatigue, you have unexplained, persistent, and relapsing 
exhaustion. 
 
Fatigue is also identified as part of human error chains. Human fatigue is broadly 
divided to physical fatigue and mental fatigue. They are both complimentary to each 
other and both will affect people adversely. Physiological and psychological factors can 
also result in human fatigue. All of us have some amount of fatigue which we can 
overcome from time to time. But when it becomes heavy, then our capabilities start 
diminishing. Medically Fatigue is considered as a symptom, not a condition. 
 
Fatigue has been a difficult problem to investigate. Many seafarers though experience 
fatigue; they do not report it, basically because they do not clearly understand it. 
Effectively dealing with fatigue in the maritime environment requires a comprehensive 
and holistic approach that recognizes ship design, and the roles and responsibilities of 
all stakeholders in the mitigation and management of fatigue. An effective fatigue 
management strategy begins with determining operational workload requirements and 
matching onboard manning levels and onshore support resources, combined with 
efficient management of workload and hours of work and rest on board the ship. There 
is no one-system approach to addressing fatigue, but there are certain principles that 
should be addressed in order to gain the knowledge and the understanding to manage 
this human element issue 
 
Working in harsh and/or uncomfortable environmental conditions can contribute to the 
risk of fatigue in a number of ways. Heat, cold, noise and vibration are some of the 
environmental conditions that can make ship staff to tire quicker and impair their 
performance. The mental and physical demands of work can contribute to fatigue in a 
number of ways. Concentrating for extended periods of time, performing repetitious or 
monotonous work or performing work that requires continued physical effort can 
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increase the risk of fatigue by producing mental and/or physical tiredness. Ships 
movements such as heave, surge, sway, roll, pitch, yaw all can affect the people on 
board.  
 
 
The IMO guidelines defines fatigue as, “ a state of physical and/or mental impairment 
resulting from factors such as inadequate sleep, extended wakefulness, work/rest 
requirements, out of sync with circadian rhythms and physical, mental or emotional 
exertion that can impair alertness and the ability to safely operate a ship or perform 
safety-related duties. IMO recognizes fatigue as a hazard and that it is not an-in-thing 
of maritime occupation. 
 
 
Then is the effect of circadian rhythms. Most seafarers have a work cycle of 4 hours 
duty and then eight-hour rest continued with 4 hours duty and 8 hours rest in a day’s 
cycle. But most of the time they must take care of other work, documentation and the 
personal requirements. They are on call during their stay on board. The work load will 
go high during port operations, cargo operations, and emergency situations and during 
break downs, without mentioning unforeseen situations like war, piracy or rescue 
operations. 
 
 
Seafarers lack “quality sleep”, even though they may try to rest. Hence so-called rest 
hours shown need not be the indication of quality sleep. Sleep deficit can lead to 
problems of sleep apnea. Along with fatigue generation, it can lead to long term 
degeneration of brain and psychological problems. What is more, change of geological 
locations, effect of time variations resulting in so called jetlag, etc. can also be some 
factors to consider. 
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Fatigue can also result from and also result in some long‐term health problems, such 
as:  
 
• digestive problems 
• heart disease 
• stress  
• harmful drug and alcohol use, and 
• mental illness. 
 
 
Ship staff needs to remain alert all the time to identify fatigue build-up of themselves 
and their colleagues. Any change in their usual-self must be reported and remedial 
action must be taken. 
 
 
Indicators of fatigue: 
 
• Mood changes – low energy, lethargy, tired, weariness 
• Mental changes – forgetfulness, distraction, fear, frustration, low alert, 
cognitive reduction 
• Physical – headache, body pain, sleep apnea, lack of appetite 
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5. Implementation 
 
The implementation of the TMSA program has brought up notable changes and 
significant results to maritime management companies. The differentiations imposed 
by TMSA are not the same for each company, as each one presents unique 
characteristics (fleet number, code of safe management, quality level that it wants to 
achieve). In addition, each managing company selects the extent to which the program 
will be used and thus the level of safety and environmental excellence it seeks to reach. 
The most updated version of the program has offered the companies options and 
advantages that were not at their disposal and additional tools that help in the success 
of fewer errors and failures. 
 
5.1. Human factor’s significant role in TMSA3 ‘s elements 
 
It is largely supported that if TMSA3 is used as a customer attracting tool, it can deliver 
significant profits to one company. This is due to the fact that it is a form of 
"advertising" for the company itself. Through this, an organization can communicate to 
a customer, the level that the first one handles the different situations that occur. In 
addition, many times, companies come faced with many gaps that occur when using 
the program. When these gaps are perceived by the competent authorities, immediate 
solutions and guidelines are created to improve their procedures and the way they face 
potential difficulties. Thus, with these changes, each organism is positively 
differentiated and achieves higher levels of safety and quality. Essentially, the more a 
company complies with the renewed guidelines and the standards of the program, the 
higher levels of environmental excellence it achieves. Moreover, it is argued that 
because this company is moving in the spirit of continuous improvement, it does not 
consider that excellence in safety and environmental awareness can be achieved but 
says that TMSA3 is a helper in the effort. This, since it is based on "Best Practices" that 
have been observed in the shipping industry. As the TMSA3 considers "acquired" the 
verses of TMSA2, it sets the bar high enough and therefore creates the need for more 
complete procedures which in turn, lead to better performances in possible inspections 
(e.g. Vetting). Although, TMSA2 has set KPIs that encapsulated human factor in a 
precocious way, TMSA3 has clearly targeted to demonstrate human factor in every 
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possible way. The following table, summarizes the cited KPIs in both TMSA2 and 
TMSA3, plus it mentions the new KPIs set by TMSA3 regarding the Human Factor. 
Table 12: TMSA2-3’s  KPI gap analysis regarding “Human Factor” 
ELEMENT  STAGE KPI TMSA 
2 
TMSA 
3 
1. Management, 
Leadership and 
Accountability  
2.3 
Vessel and shore-based management 
teams promote HSSE excellence. + + 
4.3 
All personnel demonstrate 
commitment to HSSE excellence  + + 
2. Recruitment 
and Management 
of Shore- Based 
Personnel  
1.1-1.2 
Recruitment process ensures 
candidates for key shore positions 
have the appropriate qualifications, 
experience and competence 
+ + 
4.3 
The company promotes appropriate 
interpersonal skills training  + + 
3. Recruitment 
and Management 
of Vessel 
Personnel 
1.1 
Procedures for the section, recruitment 
and promotion of all vessel personnel + + 
2.4 
Procedures identify additional training 
needs for individual personnel  - + 
2.6 The company monitors and records 
training results and effectiveness - + 
2.7 There is a promotion procedure 
+ + 
3.1 Enhanced appraisals for Senior 
Officers + + 
4.1 Procedures to assess crew members 
for job competency + + 
4.3 Cross- cultural interpersonal skills are 
promoted - + 
3A. Wellbeing of 
Vessel Personnel 
3.1 
Seminars for senior officers promote, 
emphasize and enhance the SMS + + 
4. Vessel 
Reliability and 
Maintenance 
4.5 
Engineering audits by  a suitably 
qualified and experienced company 
representative while  on passage.  
- + 
5. Navigational 
Safety 
3.2 Senior Officers receive appropriate 
ship-handling training before 
promotion to Master or assignment to 
a new vessel type.  
- + 
3.3 Navigational audits while on passage 
by a suitably qualified and 
experienced  
company representative.  
- + 
4.3 Competency assessment programs 
ensure that  Masters and navigation  - + 
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officers maintain core and  specialist 
skills.  
4.4 Navigator officers undertake periodic  
refresher BRM simulator training + + 
6. Cargo, Ballast, 
Tank Cleaning, 
Bunkering 
and Mooring 
operations 
4.2 
Audits by a qualified and experienced 
company representative include 
observation of cargo, ballast, tank 
cleaning, bunker handling and 
mooring 
ops. 
- + 
9. Safety 
Management- 
Shore based 
Monitoring 
3.2 
Proprietary safety tools are used to 
encourage hazard identification 
and to improve safety awareness. - + 
3.3 
Management identifies opportunities 
to strengthen the safety culture 
through interaction with fleet 
personnel. 
- + 
4.1 
Leading and lagging indicators of 
safety 
performance are analyzed across the 
fleet and on an individual vessel basis 
to identify areas where the 
safety culture can be improved. 
- + 
9A. Safety 
Management- 
Fleet Monitoring 
1.2 
The company safety culture 
encourages all personnel to identify, 
report and address hazards. 
- + 
2.1 
Intervention to prevent unsafe acts and 
conditions is encouraged. - + 
3.1 
Procedures encourage the reporting of 
safety best practices. - + 
3.2 
Procedures measure and compare the 
strength of safety culture across the 
fleet to identify areas for improvement 
and to provide motivation to crew. 
+ + 
13. Maritime 
Security 
TOTALLY NEW ELEMENT 
Source: Author generated 
 
Companies are getting in compliance with the new TMSA guidelines, but the question 
is, what are the steps that the shipping managers follow to prepare their fleet and office 
for an imminent inspection? Taking into account the changes from TMSA3 the 
following movements are identified based on the additional requirements and changes 
of this new TMSA. What is more, according to the best practices provided by the arisen 
KPIs, it would be very interesting to study how should or how do, the oil companies, 
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already, really implement the TMSA, as far as the new-born need, of manipulating the 
human factor in the elements of the TMSA that plays a significant role.  
 
1st Element – Leadership and the safety management system 
The Alpha and the Omega of a shipping company is the way in which it chooses to 
synchronize and manage the Safety management system documents which it sends and 
informs throughout its fleet and in which each sailor must have access to keep up 
properly with the company's regulations. A platform for communication between ship 
and company is the basis for the creation of the appropriate management system. 
Leadership can establish and share critical policy documents across a maritime 
organization with the ability to produce clearly defined roles and responsibilities, 
ensure roles within the shore organization and fleet are altered and have easy access to 
policies, and assign mandatory readership and acknowledgments ensuring all personnel 
is kept up-to-date. Leadership and management evolve through the correct 
communication of ship and office through annual management reviews and fleet 
circulars and Safety campaigns on board. A very effective method to achieve such a 
goal is to make employees regardless their position, to comply with the responsibilities 
that employees of even higher or lower level in the managing hierarchy, account for, 
and the way they would behave in order to succeed the goal. Role-play scenarios during 
company’s insight seminars could provide such an achievement 
 
2nd Element – Recruitment and management of shore-based personnel 
The company must pronounce to its employees the appropriate and correct job 
description in order to achieve the desired result of work and loyalty by its employees. 
Correct promotion, training needs and proper task management must be offered by the 
company. So, the worker stays faithful to it, tries for the common good and forms a 
positive image for the company outward. Happy employee equates to positive 
advertising. 
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3rd Element – Recruitment, management, and wellbeing of vessel personnel 
Defined rank wise processes in the recruitment module. The document requirement 
matrix which is defined within company’s platform, enabling documents to be checked 
when personnel is planned/signed on to a vessel, providing alerts when gaps are 
recognized. The provision to enter the manning scale is important too. If the crew 
complement goes below the safe manning requirement, alerts are generated. Appraisals 
that can be configured (as per requirements) with their workflows should be defined in 
the system. The provision for recording the attendance of the seafarers to seminars 
conducted by the company or need to be contacted. 
 
4th Element – Vessel reliability and maintenance including critical equipment 
For this element companies can provide a work planning module. This is a useful tool 
because a company will be able to complete overview of all tasks and enables a fleet to 
be kept up-to-date on all planned or unscheduled maintenance work. Through this, each 
company will be able to built-in dashboards and reports provide a real-time overview 
of KPIs by monitoring overdue maintenance, critical equipment and work procedures, 
the status of essential spares, and to keep track of targets. The interactive dashboards 
not only provide a visualization of data but enable users to open relevant records and 
act directly. Other tools could be the following: 
-Smart Data: 
Capture structural integrity data such as tank inspections or crankshaft deflection along 
with planned maintenance work orders with automatic trending in the system using 
dashboards. 
-Inventory 
Critical Spares inventory must be maintained in order to manage the spares needed in 
case of need or expiration. Keep your critical spares list up to date with a mobility 
platform, which lets you perform inventory audits, and scanning on the go with the 
future planning module built into the system, plan for critical jobs, and order spares in 
time using the integrated procurement system. 
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-Keep Improving 
Keep improving the planned maintenance system through a formal change request 
process for monitoring and implementation of changes and correction to maintenance 
information within the platform. 
 
Element 5: Navigational Safety  
Senior officers receive appropriate ship-handling. Training before promotion to Master 
or assignment to a new vessel type. TMSA attaches great importance to the navigation 
part, due to the significance of human factor. The naval personnel involved in this piece, 
must have adequate training. Both the machines and the naval personnel must adhere 
to, and follow all regulations, regarding the company's cyber security.  
 
Element 6-Cargo, Ballast, Tank Cleaning, Bunkering and Mooring operations 
In this area, human element plays a very key role. The sailor must be able to cope with 
all reported events of the element. Again, proper training and crisis management 
seminars are necessary for the individual to function properly and calmly.  
 
Element 9: Safety Management-Shore based Monitoring  
The Office must follow all basic safety rules such as emergency exits, hazard plans, 
signals, fire extinguishers and flashlights at easy-to-reach points. All personnel must be 
aware of and hear the company's safety manual. Misses must be reported and basic 
regulations safety should be known to all. Drills for crisis management must take part 
at least once a year. 
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5.2. Tools to implement resilience 
 
What is to be further noticed, is that objectives should be listed for those, who work at 
every level in every company. Staff should be given specific aims and targets and above 
all else, management should be willing to listen and learn. 
KPIs should be established, which could take in the numbers of pollution incidents, 
accidents, audit findings resolved, near miss reports, inspection results, customer 
complaints, the time taken from completion of an audit until its issuance and 
distribution and the number of audits performed against audits planned. 
 
But then, tanker shipping seems to be all about compliance. Everybody must comply 
with the requirements of regulations, rules, standards, codes and directives. Along 
comes TMSA3 and all of a sudden, tanker shipping won't be a compliance industry. It 
won’t be only regulation driven. It will be proactive, continuously improving, self-
regulating, self-assessing and self-assessed; because what occurs from the human 
nature, and the multidimensional meaning of the term human factor, returns back to 
human. 
 
The aforementioned, captures the philosophy, of all the agreed actions many companies 
use to give answers to questions such as:  
• What are the personal behaviors and values that contribute to good safety 
performance? 
• What should be done to have a zero-incident industry? 
• How to make a person and moreover a system, resilient? 
Research from other industries, similar to the maritime transport industry, such as oil 
& gas industry and aviation industry has shown that leadership visits, reflective learning 
and learning engagement tool are significant factors to access the ability to bounce back 
and learn from adversity. 
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Shell as an Oil Major Company, supports that it is of a big importance to build  
resilience and the ability to remain focused even in the most stressful situations. This is 
crucial for both individuals and teams. Shell is the first company to demonstrate a 
complete program implementing resilience. The company's resilience program is team-
based; it is based on a series of modules which focus on specific resilience techniques. 
The program lets participants learn together. Strengthening and supporting each other. 
Resilience techniques are practiced using scenarios and the participants share insights 
on how to apply resilience to their lives and to safety critical situations. Working 
proactively on resilience as a team benefits from others interpretation. It is the only way 
to keep ourselves, our teams, our assets and the environment safe. 
Shell, as the first to invent the theme of resilience in maritime affairs, has set a 
framework of five core modules in order to cope with, each taking between 30 minutes 
and 1 hour, which can be delivered by a volunteer facilitator in any order. Each module 
focuses on a different area that makes up our natural capacity to deal with life’s 
challenges. The five modules are: 
o What is Resilience? 
o Take Decisive Action 
o Keep Things in Perspective 
o Change is a Part of Living 
o Take Care of Yourself 
The resilience package includes everything that is needed for a vessel’s staff to 
successfully deliver the modules on board. No additional specialist expertise is 
required. To help in running the sessions the package is built using the facilitator guide 
and the participant guide and has the required materials for each session. As the 
participants guide will be kept by the participants they can make personal notes which 
can be referred to at a later date for their own use. 
Shell fully applies this program to its own vessels, and  compels the shipowners and the 
management companies to follow the program in order to charter their vessels. 
Greek shipowners and companies are in great efforts to cope with the program using 
Shell’s modules. Greek companies, such as Almi Tankers S.A, Ionic Shipping (MGT) 
Inc., Neda Maritime Agency Co Ltd., Thenamaris Ship Management Inc. and Minerva 
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Marine Inc. have already started implementing the program according to newsletters 
and magazines, in collaboration with Venlys. 
 
 
5.3 Getting into deeper thoughts 
 
On January 15, 2009, Sullenberger was the captain of US Airways Flight 1549, an 
Airbus A320 taking off from LaGuardia Airport in New York City. Shortly after 
takeoff, the plane struck a flock of Canada geese and lost power in both engines. 
Quickly determining he would be unable to reach either LaGuardia or Teterboro airport, 
Sullenberger piloted the plane to a water landing on the Hudson River. All 155 people 
on board survived and were rescued by nearby boats. 
Sullenberger said later: "It was very quiet as we worked, my copilot Jeff Skiles and I. 
We were a team. But to have zero thrust coming out of those engines was shocking”. 
Sullenberger was the last to leave the aircraft, after twice making sweeps through the 
cabin to make sure all passengers and crew had evacuated. 
Sullenberger, described was noted for his poise and calm during the crisis; nonetheless, 
Sullenberger suffered symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder in subsequent weeks, 
including sleeplessness and flashbacks. He said that the moments before the ditching 
were "the worst sickening, pit-of-your-stomach, falling-through-the-floor feeling" that 
he had ever experienced. He also said: "One way of looking at this might be that for 42 
years, I've been making small, regular deposits in this bank of experience, education 
and training. And on January 15, the balance was sufficient so that I could make a very 
large withdrawal”. 
The National Transportation Safety Board ruled that Sullenberger made the correct 
decision in landing on the river instead of attempting a return to LaGuardia because the 
normal procedures for engine loss are designed for cruising altitudes, not immediately 
after takeoff. Simulations performed at the Airbus Training Centre Europe in Toulouse 
showed that Flight 1549 could have made it back to LaGuardia had that maneuver 
begun immediately after the bird strike. However, such scenarios both neglected the 
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time necessary for the pilots to understand and assess the situation, and risked the 
possibility of a crash within a densely populated area. 
This aviation’s industry, incident, triggers thoughts such as: Is resilience measurable? 
And if yes, does a seafarer’s resilience change over the years in case of the maritime 
industry? What about measuring human performance? And if we take into account that 
human performance is measurable in the aviation sector, when and how will it be 
measured in the maritime industry? Are psychometric assessments enough to measure 
human performance in maritime industry? 
What is more, the example of Sullenberger, proves that although human factor’s issues 
could and may have affected him, he succeeded great human performance, excellent 
resilience, and finally took the perfect decision judging from the result. So if once 
needed, was a success, there must be great effort to make it happen ever needed time 
whatever it may takes.  
 
 
5.3 Proposals 
 
The keys to success: 
 
• Leadership engagement 
• Be humble and encourage participation 
• Campaign in office and on vessels 
• Build on positives and successes 
 
The way to achieve the above goals is by implementing valuable habits to the 
employees of a company.  Moreover, leading and lagging indicators and their 
importance must be distinguished.  
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For example, if talking about the personnel on board: 
• Get connected.  
The most important factor in order a crew member to be resilient is to stay in contact 
with his loved ones while onboard. Each company must give all the necessary tools 
(telephone, internet) to its crew in order to be able its crew to building strong, positive 
relationships with loved ones and friends while he travels. This can provide crew with 
needed support and acceptance in both good times and bad. 
• Learn from experience.  
Company must train its crew to recognize difficult times and learn from the past 
incidents. Company must teach its crew to consider the skills and strategies that helped 
them through rough times. A discussion presents a difficult experience onboard of every 
crew member may help and guide their future behavior. 
• Remain hopeful.  
You can't change the past, but you can always look toward the future. Accepting and 
even anticipating change makes it easier to adapt and view new challenges with less 
anxiety. This can be the continuation of the discussion we mentioned above. 
• Take care of yourself.  
Everyone must tend to his self his own needs and feelings. Participate in activities and 
hobbies they enjoy. Include physical activity in their daily routine. Get plenty of sleep. 
Eat a healthy diet. Practice stress management and relaxation techniques, such as yoga, 
meditation, guided imagery, deep breathing or prayer. Sometimes all these are difficult 
to take place onboard. But a Company can create programs like yoga and meditation in 
its premises for crew ashore in order to have the right attitude when onboard and be 
able to relax in stressful times.  
• Be proactive. 
Crew must now that Company’s personnel doesn’t ignore their problems, and same 
they must be done for their selves. Instead, figure out what needs to be done, each crew 
member must make a plan, and take action. Although it can take time to recover from 
a major setback, traumatic event or loss, they must know that their situation can 
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improve if they work at it. Crew department of a Company must be able to 
communicate everything and every time the needs of their crew. 
• Attend a resilience training program 
Employees with high levels of personal and professional resiliency foster confidence, 
productivity and profit. More and more shipping organizations turn to such training 
programs with the aim to provide managers and teams with the necessary skills. These 
programs help to understand how mind works and the difference between pressure and 
stress, provide strategies enabling to improve personal resilience and performance and 
equip people with the resources to design their own plan to get physically and mentally 
healthier and develop their resilience.  
• Resilience virtual drills 
As the world go faster and accidents onboard may happen every day the old fashion 
drills can’t stand alone anymore. A proposal may be crew and superintendents to 
participate in a simulation of an accident. Virtual reality may help this “drill” to take 
place in places outside the office and vessel. Crew will have the opportunity to 
experience feelings and situation and try to find solution in an incident.  
For example, in case of a collision, in a virtual reality drill the Captain and the rest of 
the crew may follow some specific actions in order to report the incident to port 
authorities, their companies and to all parties concerned. But what about their feelings 
and their reactions in that moment?  
Through a virtual drill, crew members will be able to feel their emotions and handle 
them as wrong and as good as they can. They will be able to face their feelings and in 
case a real problem occurred they will know how to manage themselves in order to 
avoid panic and act.  
• Resilience starts from the Office 
In order to have a healthy crew who will be able to act in a resilient way, the company 
must also focus to how this can be happened. Specifically, what is the thing that office 
personnel and superintendents are doing in order to give the correct example to the crew 
and protect them for unpleasant feelings. 
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While on board vessels do technical superintendents get involved in any kind of risk 
management processes? Genuine safety communicating, getting involved and showing 
the importance of risk management will stimulate crew understanding of its importance 
and feel comfortable to do same.  
After a job requiring a Permit to Work does technical vessel management get involved 
in the debriefing process? Since technical vessel management manage a number of 
vessel debriefings could help pass on important learnings from other vessels. 
To what degree does the operation department coordinate activities with other 
departments to avoid crew fatigue? Ship crews have many activities and an important 
objective is to avoid doing too much at one time. Operations departments have a large 
influence on the timing of activities.  
While in the process of purchasing new safety shoes, to what degree will the purchase 
department investigate the quality of the shoes? Since slips, trips and falls are the most 
common cause of personal injuries it is worth investigating prior to buying hundreds of 
pairs of shoes how ‘slip resistant’ they are through simple testing on board.  
There are many things that Companies must have in mind in order to be able to learn to 
their crew to be resilient. First of all, personnel in the office must learn to be resilient 
in order to be able to explain and help the crew in the most correct way. 
To succeed in all possible ways, implementing the “human factor’ as a KPI should 
entail, the honesty of every answer and response, everybody gives at first to himself 
about his doings.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
The maritime and, in particular, the international shipping industry have undergone a 
major change in attitude over the last decades. A focus on quality, safety and, 
ultimately, the environment has developed in this industry driven by serious incidents, 
both involving humans and the environment. The development of tanker vetting 
schemes, the increasing employment of Quality Management Systems which were set 
up by the International Standardization Organization and the establishment of an 
international mandatory quality standard for the shipping industry, the International 
Safety Management Code, reflect this change in attitude. These developments have 
stretched out for over more than two decades. At first, the main focus was on the safe 
operation of vessels, but within the last years, it has swung to contributing to the 
sustainable use of the world’s resources and, therefore, to environmental management 
systems. 
The introduction of non-financial performance measurements was necessary due to the 
new quality awareness resulting in the practice of continual improvement. The TSMA 
also has to be seen, in many respects, as a Performance Measurement System, 
especially due to its background as an assessment of a tanker operator’s compliance to 
the ISM Code and its performance under the ISM Code. What is more to be noticed is, 
that the anthropocentric theorisis of safety (safety II) brought up TMSA’s third version 
need, to enhance the parameter of human factor. By analyzing all the aspects of the 
human factor and the way it affects all the maritime areas we understand the necessity 
of self-assessing, so that we develop ourselves as in order to think and act proactively.  
There come the ideas of human error, human reliability, leadership and resilience. The 
findings, how should they be implemented as KPIs along with the writer’ s proposals 
are the main contribution of this thesis.  
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